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INTRODUCTION
The United States Congress frequently deliberates upon and de-
cides questions of constitutional interpretation, and many of those
decisions are immune from subsequent judicial review, de jure or de
facto. To mention only the currently prominent examples, consider
Congress’s exclusive responsibility under Articles I and II to define
and apply the Impeachment Clauses,1 and its authority under the
Twelfth Amendment to certify and count electoral votes in presiden-
tial elections.2 In such cases, legal scholars typically draw upon con-
troversial normative theories of constitutional interpretation to assess
Congress’s performance. In this Essay, we join the discussion by ask-
ing whether and how Congress’s interpretive capacity can be im-
proved. But we depart from the usual approach by crafting our pro-
posals in a manner that is resolutely agnostic as among the standard
normative theories of constitutional interpretation. Our aim is to pro-
pose incremental reforms to which proponents of all the standard
theories might subscribe.
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This search for small-scale, consensual improvements dictates
our focus on the internal mechanics of congressional deliberation, an
area that is rarely explored in the constitutional law literature on con-
gressional interpretation of the Constitution. That literature, taking
its inspiration from James Bradley Thayer,3 addresses itself almost
exclusively to a large-scale question of institutional choice: as be-
tween Congress and other institutions, particularly the Supreme
Court, how should authority to render initial or conclusive interpreta-
tions of the Constitution be allocated?4 We will pursue a different
strategy by focusing not upon questions of institutional choice but
upon questions of institutional design. Given some allocation of con-
stitutional authority between Congress and the judiciary, how can the
rules that structure congressional operations be arranged to produce
the right quantity and quality of congressional deliberation on consti-
tutional questions?
The justifications for this strategy are both methodological and
substantive. The scholarly benefit of exploring the neglected question
of institutional design is much greater than the benefit produced by
another article about “Congress versus the Court.” And the institu-
tional-choice question has largely been settled, not by constitutional
scholarship, but by the facts of modern government. The massive
scale of the political branches relative to the judiciary—measured in
resources, personnel and organizational capacities—ensures that,
across a broad range of constitutional questions, the legislative proc-
ess rather than the Court has de jure or de facto authority to decide
constitutional questions. Consider the large domain of constitutional
decisionmaking over which the Supreme Court has essentially ceded
control to the political branches by articulating deferential standards
of review, limits on standing and justiciability, and the political-
question doctrine. Impeachments and many issues involving electoral
processes generally lie within this domain, and other questions do as
well.5 In general, we will focus our discussion on these areas of consti-
tutional law, rather than on areas subject to judicial review.
3. James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitu-
tional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 156 (1893) (arguing that judges should defer heavily to legis-
lative interpretations of the Constitution).
4. For a recent example, see MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM
THE COURTS (1999).
5. See infra notes 22-37 and accompanying text (listing areas in which the congressional
determination of constitutional questions is not subject to judicial review).
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Our recommendations for institutional design produce a set of
structural proposals intended to improve Congress’s deliberations
and decisions concerning constitutional issues. These proposals draw
upon Congress’s recent experience with procedural frameworks like
the congressional budget process, constitutional points of order in the
Senate, and legislative rules in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act.6
We identify and explain institutional design improvements in four ar-
eas: producing and disseminating information; developing expert
congressional staff; restructuring congressional committees; and im-
plementing rules to shape floor consideration.
The discussion is structured as follows. Part I explains the institu-
tional-design strategy and defines criteria for assessing competing de-
sign proposals. Part II describes and justifies our substantive propos-
als. Part III concludes by considering the time frame within which
such proposals might be adopted.
I.  INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE, INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, AND THE
THAYERIAN CONGRESS
In this part we detail our assumptions, define our aims, and situ-
ate our project against the background of the relevant literatures in
constitutional law, public choice, and empirical political science. Sec-
tion A explains the idea of a Thayerian Congress and justifies the in-
stitutional-design strategy we will pursue. Section B explains our as-
sumptions about legislators’ behavior. Section C gives more precise
content to the goal of improving Congress’s constitutional perform-
ance.
A. Toward a Structured Thayerian Congress
James Bradley Thayer’s 1892 address on “The Origin and Scope
of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law”7 provides the
starting point for most subsequent discussion of Congress’s capacities
as a constitutional interpreter. Thayer argued that judges should em-
ploy a rational-basis standard for reviewing congressional determina-
tions of constitutional questions and gave two principal reasons for
this position.8 First, many constitutional questions encompass not
merely technical legal issues, but instead large questions of constitu-
6. Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (1995) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1504
(Supp. 2000)).
7. Thayer, supra note 3, at 129-56.
8. Id.
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tional policy and politics that legislators are better suited to decide
than judges.9 Second, aggressive judicial review of congressional de-
terminations would encourage Congress to slough its constitutional
responsibilities onto the courts, weakening the culture of representa-
tive democracy.10 A “Thayerian” Congress, accordingly, is a Congress
that has a great deal of responsibility for deciding constitutional ques-
tions.
For present purposes, the most important feature of Thayer’s
analysis is that it is solely devoted to institutional choice, including
dynamic analysis of the consequences of constitutional interaction be-
tween branches, but it says very little about institutional design. Insti-
tutional choice asks which social tasks should be allocated to which
institutions, holding the design of those institutions constant; institu-
tional design asks what internal structure and decision rules institu-
tions should have, holding the allocation of social tasks across institu-
tions constant. Both institutional choice and institutional design are
necessary components of normative constitutional analysis. Thayer,
however, ignores the design question. Thayer’s Congress is boneless;
it lacks any internal structure, appearing solely as a stage backdrop
against which individual legislator-statesmen act.
There is nothing necessarily objectionable about this recon-
structed version of Thayer’s project, so far as it goes. Although a fully
specified constitutional theory would answer institutional-choice
questions and institutional-design questions simultaneously, calibrat-
ing the resulting prescriptions with one another, no particular project
need answer all of the relevant questions at once. Something must be
held constant to provide a starting point, and we can understand
Thayer as simply bracketing design questions in the expectation that
subsequent analysis would take them up, given a set of provisional
conclusions on the institutional-choice question.
That subsequent analysis is exactly what we propose to do here.
Our project is to provide the internal structure for Thayer’s Con-
gress—to evaluate congressional institutions and procedures with a
view to improving Congress’s constitutional performance. For two
reasons, this appears a more promising avenue than continued pursuit
of the institutional-choice question.
The first reason is that the institutional-choice literature has pro-
gressed far enough that a switch to institutional-design questions
9. Id.
10. Id.
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should now produce greater intellectual returns. The modern consti-
tutional law literature is centrally concerned with the allocation of
constitutional decisionmaking authority across the institutions of the
national government. This is a principal theme of important works by
Bickel,11 Ely,12 and Sunstein,13 among others. By contrast, that litera-
ture has barely begun to explore the institutional-design question.
Consider Paul Brest’s famous article on the “conscientious” legisla-
tor’s responsibility in constitutional interpretation.14 Brest addresses
his advice to an abstract individual legislator who apparently consid-
ers constitutional questions in an institutional vacuum. Like Thayer,
Brest shows little awareness that the power of legislators is collective
rather than individual; one senator acting alone has less formal legal
authority than does a police officer, for example. Consequently, leg-
islators work within a collective institutional structure that determines
their performance as constitutional interpreters and decisionmakers.
The design of that institutional structure more powerfully determines
Congress’s interpretive capacities than does any individual legislator’s
conscience.
To be sure, the institutional-design question is helpfully ad-
dressed in the extensive public-choice literature on legislative voting
rules, committee structure, and other topics, and in the related consti-
tutional choice literature stemming from Buchanan and Tullock.15
While this literature is useful, it has limitations that undermine its sig-
nificance for normative constitutional theory. A significant propor-
tion of this literature works on a blank canvas, asking about major
structural choices such as the choice between unicameralism and bi-
11. See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962) (ex-
amining the scope of judicial review and the power of the United States Supreme Court).
12. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1980) (suggesting a process-based theory of judicial review).
13. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME (1999) (arguing for a minimal-
ist form of judicial review).
14. Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator’s Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27
STAN. L. REV. 585 (1975).
15. See generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF
CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1967) (analyzing the
calculus of rational individuals when faced with constitutional choice). For descriptions of rele-
vant public-choice literature, see generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY &
ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE
CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY ch. 1 (3d ed. forthcoming 2001); DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P.
FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991) (reviewing the body
of public-choice literature and examining its applications); MAXWELL L. STEARNS, PUBLIC
CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW: READINGS AND COMMENTARY (1997) (presenting an anthology of
public-choice literature).
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cameralism, between majority and supermajority voting rules, and
(with respect to the selection of the legislators themselves) the choice
between plurality voting and proportional representation.16 As dis-
cussed below, however, we confine ourselves to incremental propos-
als, on the assumption that most of the large structural choices about
Congress are irrevocably fixed and that any design improvements that
are practically attainable will come only at the margins. Relatedly,
because of its focus on constitutional creation from the ground up,
much of the public-choice literature fails to take constitutional inter-
pretation seriously as a distinct task that legislators might perform
more or less successfully under alternative institutional designs. By
contrast, the most directly useful literature for our purposes is a small
set of political-science research on the relative capacities of different
congressional committees as constitutional interpreters and decision-
makers.17 One of our purposes is to adapt this research as an aid to
normative constitutional theory.
The second reason for turning to the institutional-design ques-
tion is that, despite the continuing academic controversy, the institu-
tional-choice question has largely been settled by force of economic,
social, and institutional developments. And it has been settled in fa-
vor of extensive congressional authority to decide constitutional ques-
tions. Although the judiciary can and does review federal statutes for
constitutionality, in many domains the realities of modern govern-
ment ensure that Congress’s authority to decide constitutional ques-
tions is effectively paramount. Neil Komesar has insisted upon this
point,18 although constitutional law scholars have largely ignored it,
perhaps because it is empirical rather than conceptual.
In the twentieth century, nonjudicial institutions of government
have grown much faster than the judiciary; consider that in 1999 the
16. E.g., BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 15, at 119-262 (examining these structural
choices); GIOVANNI SARTORI, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING passim (2d ed.
1997) (discussing structural choices); Saul Levmore, Bicameralism: When Are Two Decisions
Better than One?, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 145, 146 (1992) (discussing the relationship be-
tween structural choices and decisionmaking).
17. E.g., DONALD G. MORGAN, CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF
RESPONSIBILITY passim (1966) (discussing Congress’s role in constitutional interpretation);
KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING passim (1999) (examining how the Constitution operates within
the political sphere); Mark C. Miller, Congressional Committees and the Federal Courts: A Neo-
Institutional Perspective, 45 W. POL. Q. 949, 949 (1992) (examining the differences in interac-
tions between three congressional committees and the Federal courts).
18. NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 251 (1994).
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total federal judicial budget was $3.79 billion, while the administrative
budget of the political branches alone ran to some $80 billion—
twenty-one times larger.19 Congress, the White House, and the federal
administrative agencies form an institutional system whose current
scale and scope—measured by resources, revenue, personnel,
outputs, or any other dimension—dwarfs the scale on which courts
operate. This disparity ensures that the judiciary lacks the logistical
capacity to review more than a small fraction of political-branch
decisions, including congressional decisions embodied in statutes that
raise constitutional questions. The Court’s peak capacity runs to
about 150 cases per year, most of which concern statutory
interpretation rather than constitutional adjudication, whereas in the
past decade Congress has produced an average of about 585 new
public laws per year, and administrative agencies have produced
thousands of new regulations.20 Many of these laws pose no
constitutional questions, and to some extent the Court can
compensate for its capacity constraints by deciding fewer cases but
issuing broader rules in the cases it does decide.21 In general, however,
the gargantuan congressional-administrative process produces more
lawmaking than the comparatively miniscule judiciary has the
capacity to review for constitutionality.
So it is unsurprising that the Supreme Court has itself retreated
from judicial review of many types of congressional decisions. Con-
sider the following selection of congressional activities and determi-
nations, with important constitutional dimensions, that the federal
courts decline to review, either de jure under the rubric of justiciabil-
ity and political-question doctrines, or de facto under the rubric of ra-
tional-basis review:
19. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, HISTORICAL TABLES: BUDGET OF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2001, at 69 (listing outlays by agencies from 1997
to the present and including estimates through 2005); EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2001, at 279 (listing
total expenditures of the legislative and executive branches in 1999).
20. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S. 294 (1999) (listing the
number of measures passed by the 96th through 104th Congresses).
21. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 369 (1996)
(arguing that using rules instead of standards or multi-factor tests may reduce caseloads but cau-
tioning against this approach with regard to constitutional cases).
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• The procedural validity of constitutional amendments;22
• The procedural validity of enacted statutes;23
• The creation and validity of internal congressional rules;24
• “Economic and social” regulation,25 a huge category that in-
cludes
(1) regulation of the channels and instrumentalities of in-
terstate commerce and of intrastate activity that sub-
stantially affects interstate commerce;26
(2) regulation of property rights, short of a physical appro-
priation or total deprivation of value;27
(3) regulation of contractual obligations;28
• Spending for the general welfare, both conditional29 and un-
conditional;
• Use and disposition of the property of the United States;30
• Delegation of rulemaking authority to the Executive or to
independent agencies;31
22. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 456 (1939) (holding that the validity of ratification by
state legislatures is a political question).
23. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 673 (1892) (refusing to consider extrinsic evidence to
question the enrollment of a bill). But cf. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 387
(1990) (holding that Origination Clause issues are justiciable).
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (authorizing each house of Congress to “determine the
Rules of its Proceedings”).
25. Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955) (holding that economic and
social regulation receives only rational basis review).
26. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (noting that the federal commerce
power extends to the categories in text); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995)
(same).
27. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (explaining that a per se tak-
ing exists only where there is a physical appropriation or a total deprivation of value).
28. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 447 (1934) (holding that where the
protective power of a state is exercised in a manner otherwise appropriate in regulating busi-
ness, it is no objection that performance of existing contracts may be frustrated by the prohibi-
tion of injurious practices).
29. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210 (1987) (applying a deferential standard of re-
view to conditions accompanying federal grants of money to subnational governments); Froth-
ingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923) (denying standing to a citizen seeking to enjoin the
Secretary of the Treasury from distributing funds pursuant to the Maternity Act of 1921).
30. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 482 (1982) (determining that taxpayers lack standing to challenge the gov-
ernment’s ability to give real property to religious groups).
31. Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 773-74 (1996) (upholding a delegation to the
President of the power to define aggravating factors that permit imposition of the statutory
death penalty in military capital cases); Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 104 (1946)
(upholding a very broad delegation of the authority to regulate holding companies to an inde-
pendent agency). Some of the functions of the constitutional nondelegation doctrine have been
assumed by canons of statutory construction. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation
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• The division of war powers between Congress and the Execu-
tive;32
• Establishing rules and regulations for the military;33
• Simultaneous service in the legislature and in the Executive;34
• The admission and naturalization of aliens;35
• Confirmations and impeachments;36
• Enforcement of the “Republican Form of Government”
Clause.37
The Court still reviews federal statutes on constitutional grounds,
of course. The important point is that the substantive scope of the un-
reviewable or largely unreviewed exercises of congressional power
together amount to a large slice of the activities of the federal gov-
ernment. Komesar is right about the big picture: by and large, the Su-
preme Court has retreated to policing a restricted domain of highly
salient individual-rights issues, such as free speech and abortion
rights; to occasionally invalidating novel interbranch encroachments
in the name of the separation of powers; and to occasionally striking
down novel exercises of congressional power in the name of federal-
ism. In other domains, which is to say in a great deal of what govern-
ment does, Congress is the ultimate arbiter of constitutionality. All
the more reason, then, to think far more seriously than the literature
Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315 (2000) (arguing that the nondelegation doctrine has not been
abandoned and that it has merely been relocated to judicial constructions of federal statutes).
32. Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333, 340 (D.D.C. 1987) (declining to adjudicate, on po-
litical-question grounds, a claim for declaratory and injunctive relief under the War Powers
Act). For an analysis of the political-question doctrine’s application to foreign affairs and inter-
national relations, see Jack L. Goldsmith, The New Formalism in United States Foreign Relations
Law, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1395, 1402 (1999).
33. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973) (noting that the supervision, composition, and
training of military forces are committed to the discretion of the political branches).
34. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 222-23 (1974) (finding
that plaintiffs lacked standing to claim that armed forces reserve membership of members of
Congress violated the Constitution).
35. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 798-99 (1977) (holding that it was not for the Court to
probe the justifications for a legislative decision that preferential status is not warranted for ille-
gitimate children and their natural fathers).
36. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 229-30 (1993) (holding that the Senate had sole
discretion to choose impeachment procedures).
37. Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 147-48 (1912) (refusing to consider
a republican-form-of-government challenge to the state referendum and initiative process); Lu-
ther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 46-47 (1849) (reserving for Congress, rather than the federal courts,
the charge of enforcing the Clause).
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has to date about how Congress’s internal design can be structured to
improve Congress’s constitutional performance.
B. Some Assumptions About Legislators’ Behavior
Our concern to improve Congress’s constitutional performance
assumes that at least some legislators, some of the time, give some de-
cisional weight to reasoned constitutional argument. That premise has
been challenged by professedly “realist” strands of political science
and public choice, but the challenge rests on empirical presupposi-
tions about legislative behavior that turn out to be untenable.
The starting point is the question what ends legislators pursue.
The literature contains three distinct answers to this question. After
describing two answers that are, respectively, excessively optimistic
and excessively jaundiced, we stake out a third, intermediate position.
1. Legislators Act in the Public Interest. Early discussion of
Congress’s constitutional performance assumed an optimistic picture
of legislator-statesmen who act strictly to promote their
understanding of the common good. The public-interest view is the
positive counterpart to Burke’s trustee model of representation, a
normative stance that sees a good representative as one who exercises
independent judgment for the common weal, rather than simply
acting so as to satisfy constituents’ preferences. The public-interest
assumption persisted for a remarkably long time in the constitutional-
law literature; something similar underlies Brest’s idea of the
“conscientious” legislator. But naïve forms of optimism about
legislators have today been displaced, in most sectors of the
constitutional-law academy, by a far more skeptical account of
legislative behavior.
2. Legislators Maximize Their Chances of Reelection, or
Personal Gain More Broadly Defined. The technical public-choice
literature generally models legislative behavior on the explicit
assumption that legislators’ sole goal is to maximize their chances of
reelection. This is largely a methodological assumption, one dictated
by the positivist aspiration of public choice to render testable
predictions, which are unattainable without a precise maximand.38 As
38. Edward L. Rubin, Beyond Public Choice: Comprehensive Rationality in the Writing and
Reading of Statutes, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4 (1991) (examining the theoretical basis and goals of
public-choice theory).
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explained below, we think the assumption that legislators act solely to
maximize their chances of reelection is clearly mistaken if it is treated
as an empirical claim, but we have no quarrel with it as a
methodological premise within its proper domain.39
But there is also a broader, and looser, strand in the non-
formalized political science literature with which we do quarrel. This
strand is harder to define; these works, sometimes called “realist,”
principally share a common atmospheric that describes legislators as
maximizing personal gain in a crudely venal sense. All legislative be-
havior, on this view, is rooted in relatively tangible forms of self-
interest, such as the quests for money, fame, and power; realists typi-
cally ignore broader motives, such as personal satisfaction from justi-
fied accomplishment or the promotion of ideological goals. Some of
this work even suggests that all constitutional discourse within legisla-
tures (and maybe generally) is a sham, a cover for self-regarding mo-
tives and tactics. As Ian Shapiro titled a critique of a leading work on
deliberative democracy, “Politics Is About Interests and Power.”40
Despite its hard-headed appeal, the “realist” view either repre-
sents a pre-empirical methodological commitment or else turns out to
be indefensible. To the extent that it makes an empirical claim, it has
been falsified outright by empirical work in mainstream political sci-
ence. That work advances a third, intermediate view.
3. Legislators Pursue a Complex Set of Public and Personal
Goals. The optimistic public-interest view and the skeptical realist
view both represent implausible extremes. The mainstream view in
political science takes a more nuanced view of legislators’
motivations. Richard Fenno’s classic study found that most legislators
pursue a variety of ends simultaneously, trading goals off against one
another and giving no goal overriding priority.41 Although ensuring
reelection is one such goal, along with gaining colleagues’ respect,
another prominent goal is legislators’ desire to promote their vision of
the public interest.42 Subsequent political science work has confirmed
39. Thus, David Mayhew carefully explains that certain features of legislative behavior
may best be explained as if legislators care only about getting reelected. That the premise is
methodological, not empirical, has not always been remembered by subsequent public-choice
scholars. DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 45-49 (1974).
40. Ian Shapiro, Enough of Deliberation: Politics Is About Interests and Power, in
DELIBERATIVE POLITICS 28 (Stephen Macedo ed., 1999).
41. RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITTEES passim (1973).
42. Id. at 1.
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this account.43 Reelection is, for most legislators, a necessary means to
their preferred goals of influencing public policy for the better and
accumulating prestige with colleagues; and it is not the case that
legislators will trade everything else to secure reelection. In general,
empirical work in mainstream political science describes legislators’
diffuse ideology—legislators’ beliefs about morals, justice, good
public policy, and other intangibles—as a far more powerful
determinant of legislative behavior than the realist tradition
acknowledges.44
In the subsequent discussion, we follow this consensus by as-
suming that some legislators sometimes treat constitutional argument
as one indicator of the “public interest” or “good public policy,”
which in turn has some weight as against legislators’ other interests,
goals, and aims. In economic terms, we treat legislators as maximizing
a complex utility function, in which constitutional considerations are
one argument. This empirical starting point is not necessarily incon-
sistent with the methodological assumption in the technical public-
choice literature that legislators maximize their chances of reelection
in preference to all other aims. Even if solely oriented to reelection,
several mechanisms might cause legislators to give some weight to
constitutional argument.
First, some constituents might desire a representative who takes
constitutional argument seriously, and might punish a representative
who appears wholly opportunistic about the Constitution.45 Second,
there are many legislators who enjoy slack in their agency relation-
43. E.g., John W. Kingdon, Models of Legislative Voting, 39 J. POL. 563, 569-70 (1977)
(finding that legislators vote, in part, so as to maximize satisfaction of their constituent-
independent policy preferences). See generally JOHN W. KINGDON, CONGRESSMEN’S VOTING
DECISIONS (3d ed. 1989) (discussing legislators’ beliefs about public policy as one determinant
of their voting decisions); WILLIAM K. MUIR, JR., LEGISLATURE: CALIFORNIA’S SCHOOL FOR
POLITICS 105-37 (1982) (asserting that the nature of politics, among other factors, causes legisla-
tors to acquire and share knowledge).
44. James B. Kau & Paul H. Rubin, Economic and Ideological Factors in Congressional
Voting: The 1980 Election, 44 PUB. CHOICE 385, 385 (1984) (“[W]hile economic factors are im-
portant in explaining legislation, ideological factors are also important.”). See generally
JERROLD E. SCHNEIDER, IDEOLOGICAL COALITIONS IN CONGRESS (1979) (analyzing the con-
figurations of congressional coalitions from an ideological perspective).
45. See Mark V. Tushnet, Clarence Thomas: The Constitutional Problems, 63 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 466, 469 (1995) (noting that “a senator may gain political points by being a ‘person of
principle,’ rejecting constituent demands for substantive legislation because it violates the sena-
tor’s understanding of the constitutional scheme”); cf. James B. Kau et al., A General Equilib-
rium Model of Congressional Voting, 97 Q.J. ECON. 271, 286-87 (1982) (emphasizing that con-
stituent ideology significantly affects legislator behavior); Rubin, supra note 38, at 21 (“[R]e-
election maximizing itself does not preclude ideological motivations, because the articulation of
an ideological position might be the best way to secure re-election.”).
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ship with constituents, usually because they are from safe districts and
reelection is not a serious concern. Even on the public-choice prem-
ise, those legislators will shift to pursuing other aims, and one of those
aims will be to implement the legislators’ conceptions of good public
policy, including good constitutional law. Third, constitutional argu-
ment is given weight by the “civilizing force of hypocrisy.”46 Even a
wholly self-interested legislator cannot afford to take positions in
constitutional argument that are too transparently favorable to his
own interests. So legislators who want to invest in credibility will have
to adjust their positions to disfavor or disguise their own interests to
some degree. Likewise, the pressure to maintain a reputation for con-
sistency will, to some degree, cause even self-interested legislators to
adhere to a previously established constitutional position when, in
changed circumstances, that position works to the legislator’s disad-
vantage.
But in any event, our project is normative, not (as in the public-
choice literature) predictive. For our purposes, the question is not
how legislators’ behavior should best be modeled, but rather whether
legislative discourse about the Constitution is always strategic rather
than sincere. We think the realist account of legislators’ behavior is
itself unrealistic. The claim that public-regarding discourse within
legislatures, including constitutional discourse, is invariably a mask
for narrowly defined self-interest verges on incoherence. That view
finds it difficult to explain why legislators engage in constitutional dis-
course in the first place. After all, if everyone mouths constitutional
formulae out of self-interest, it is unclear why anyone takes constitu-
tional argument seriously, and thus unclear why there is any audience
demand for the empty discourse. The realist account can only be sal-
vaged either by assuming widespread myopia in the audience for con-
stitutional discourse—assuming, in other words, that self-interested
constitutional discourse successfully dupes other participants over the
long term, the sort of assumption that realists usually reject in other
contexts—or else by recourse to recondite theoretical epicycles.47 All
told, the attempted realist debunking provides a partial corrective to
46. Jon Elster, Alchemies of the Mind: Transmutation and Misrepresentation, 3 LEGAL
THEORY 133, 176 (1997).
47. E.g., id. at 152-53 (exploring models in which all speakers disguise self-interest in the
language of the public interest, because each speaker fears that some listener will falsely believe
that another listener will punish the first listener if the first listener fails to punish the principal
speaker for failing to speak in a public-spirited fashion). At this point, it seems to us, any meth-
odological advantages of the self-interest assumption have long since dissipated.
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the excessively optimistic assumptions of the constitutional-law litera-
ture but does little damage to the mixed picture presented by the em-
pirical work on legislatures. In what follows, then, we will not concern
ourselves unduly with the skeptical position.
C. Defining “Improvements” in Congress’s Constitutional
Performance
Our aim is to propose incremental reforms in the internal design
of Congress that will improve its constitutional performance while
remaining agnostic among contentious theories of constitutional in-
terpretation, and among controversial views of substantive policy and
politics. To that end, we define an “improvement” as a design pro-
posal that produces a net gain when assessed along three dimensions:
(1) changes in the cost of constitutional deliberation and decision-
making by the Congress; (2) changes in the cost of constitutional er-
rors by the Congress, defining error relative to an overlapping con-
sensus of background interpretive theories; and (3) the costs of
transition from the current design to the proposed design.
This formulation assumes that these costs are commensurable
and that no category of cost has lexical priority. A proposal that
might improve both the speed and quality of constitutional decision-
making, for example, should be rejected if it requires a massive re-
structuring of Congress’s internal operations. Likewise, an easily im-
plemented proposal that might produce a slight decrease in the
quality of Congress’s constitutional deliberations but would bring
enormous savings in decisionmaking costs should be encouraged, not
rejected.
1. Decision Costs and Deliberative Benefits. The most striking
fact about Congress is its severely constricted agenda.48 Despite the
enormous growth of congressional staff and the refined specialization
of its internal structure, Congress faces tight deliberative constraints
of time and information. The paramount legal status of the
Constitution does not entail that deliberation over constitutional
questions is the most important good that Congress supplies;
constitutional decisionmaking is one activity among many. So
48. See generally JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES
(2d ed. 1995) (discussing the crucial role of agenda setting in modern public policymaking and
explaining the realities that limit the agenda space).
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proposals for improvement must account for the opportunity costs of
constitutional deliberation.
Deliberation,49 however, also provides institutional and process
benefits. Deliberation exploits the collective character of legislatures
in ways that can, in principle, improve Congress’s constitutional per-
formance.50 Among the concrete benefits of deliberation are its ten-
dencies to encourage the revelation of private information, to expose
extreme, polarized viewpoints to the moderating effect of diverse ar-
guments,51 to legitimate outcomes by providing reasons to defeated
parties, and to require the articulation of public-spirited justifications
for legislators’ votes.52 The last point emphasizes the civilizing force of
hypocrisy. The need to articulate public-regarding rationales requires
participants to move away from positions too obviously tailored to
their self-interest, and partially commits them to maintain prior posi-
tions even in changed circumstances. Norms governing deliberation
thus modify actions and outcomes as well as speech.
All of these effects transpose easily to the special case of consti-
tutional deliberation. Private information is useful when constitu-
tional judgments have a substantial factual or instrumental compo-
nent, as they frequently do. The moderating and legitimating effects
of deliberation contract the scope of constitutional argument, focus
the issues, and palliate losers. Norms requiring public-oriented justifi-
cations force proposals to be tailored to those justifications in ways
that forestall the worst excesses of factional oppression.53 In addition,
deliberation makes congressional decisionmaking more accessible
and transparent to the public, which increases accountability of the
decisionmakers and may enhance the perceived legitimacy of the out-
come.
49. We use “deliberation” to refer to public deliberation in committee and floor debate, on
the record and before an audience. Congress, especially its committees, sometimes engages in
closed sessions or other forms of nonpublic deliberation, but such cases are not empirically im-
portant for our purposes.
50. See generally ANDREI MARMOR, EQUALITY AND DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITY (forth-
coming 2001) (discussing public deliberation as increasing the legitimacy of public authorities)
(on file with the Duke Law Journal).
51. Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J.
71, 75 (2000).
52. James D. Fearon, Deliberation as Discussion, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 44, 53-
56, 63-64 (Jon Elster ed., 1998) (evaluating the role of deliberation in political decisionmaking).
53. Cf. Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 265-66 (1986) (recommending
an interpretative approach that limits private-interest legislation by holding interest groups to
their public-regarding statements).
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To be sure, deliberation also suffers pathologies, quite apart
from opportunity costs: it can reduce candor, encourage posturing,
trigger herd behavior, and silence dissenters. Yet the alternative to
deliberation is simply voting without discussion, a procedure that no
modern legislature, and few if any collective bodies generally, would
ever adopt. It seems indisputable that, on net, some congressional de-
liberation on constitutional questions is better than none at all. The
real question is not whether deliberation is beneficial, but how much
deliberation is optimal. In what follows, we attempt to mold our pro-
posals with a view to maximizing the benefits and minimizing the op-
portunity costs of congressional deliberation on constitutional ques-
tions.
2. Error Costs. Any reference to constitutional “error”
presupposes substantive criteria of right and wrong, or good and bad,
in constitutional interpretation. Two such criteria dominate the legal
literature on Congress’s constitutional performance. The first is that
the Congress commits error whenever it deviates from the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the Constitution. The second is that
Congress commits error when it deviates from the outcomes dictated
by whatever particular constitutional theory the interpreter holds.
Both of these criteria are unattractive. The first applies to an ex-
cessively narrow range of constitutional questions and privileges judi-
cial analysis over other modes of reasoning about constitutional ques-
tions. The second overlooks that the aim of an institutional-design
project is not to entrench some highly contentious, substantive the-
ory, but rather to suggest consensual improvements—structural pro-
posals that would improve Congress’s constitutional performance as
judged by any of the leading constitutional approaches. So the best
criterion identifies “error” by reference to Congress’s skill at using
the wide range of sources admissible under all (plausible) interpretive
theories, and by reference to Congress’s ability to achieve outcomes
that all (plausible) theories deem reasonable. The consensual im-
provements that this criterion identifies are, of course, distinct from
the procedural benefits of deliberation previously discussed. The
moderating and legitimating effects of deliberation, for example, are
valuable even if no consensual improvements can be identified.
The first criterion holds that Congress should take the Constitu-
tion to mean whatever the Supreme Court says it means. As defended
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by Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer,54 this view does not assert
the implausible interpretive view that the Constitution actually means
whatever the Court says. Instead, the point is an institutional one.
The primary criterion for good constitutional law, the argument runs,
is that it should be clear and stable; clarity and stability in turn require
a single, paramount constitutional interpreter; and that interpreter
should be the Court.
Alexander and Schauer do not claim that their judicial-
supremacy view applies to questions not subject to judicial review.
That restriction on the scope of their theory is sensible. Limitations
on the judiciary’s political reach and logistical capacity create a broad
domain of constitutional determinations by the Congress that go un-
reviewed. What, for example, is the Senate to do when it must decide
whether some presidential malfeasance amounts to a high crime or
misdemeanor?55 The United States Reports do not speak to that ques-
tion.
The only way to expand the scope of the judicial-supremacy view
would be to say that Congress should decide constitutional questions
predictively, by guessing how the Court would decide them if it heard
them. But this is similar to the “imaginative reconstruction” approach
in constitutional law, which asks what the Framers would have done
had they known what we know now,56 and in statutory interpretation,
which asks the same question about the enacting legislators.57 In both
settings, imaginative reconstruction collapses into substantive deci-
sionmaking, because the best way to figure out what the Framers, or
legislators, or Justices would do is to figure out what the best answer
is. None of this is to deny that Supreme Court precedents constitute a
helpful input into the process of congressional deliberation on consti-
tutional questions. But precedent cannot be the only admissible
source of constitutional meaning that Congress may consult, for that
54. Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation,
110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1387 (1997) (arguing that people outside the Supreme Court should
adopt Chief Justice Hughes’s perspective that “[t]he Constitution is what the [Supreme Court]
say[s] it is”).
55. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (“The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the
United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason,
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”).
56. Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1268 (1993).
57. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP A. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT,
LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 218-20 (2000) (describing this technique in
statutory interpretation).
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rule would quite often leave Congress with no constitutional guidance
at all.
The rest of the literature tends to posit that Congress errs when-
ever it arrives at outcomes that deviate from those indicated by some
particular substantive account of constitutional interpretation. A list
of the current contenders includes, in no particular order, original-
intention interpretation,58 original-meaning interpretation,59 common-
law constitutionalism,60 process theory,61 law as integrity,62 minimal-
ism,63 and pragmatism.64 Although some of these are better described
as theories of constitutional adjudication than as interpretive theories,
and are thus of attenuated relevance to constitutional deliberation by
legislators, it is still true that a substantive approach must necessarily
elevate one of the contested interpretive accounts over its competi-
tors, despite intractable disagreement among proponents of these
views.
By ignoring the phenomenon of chronic disagreement about in-
terpretive theory, this sort of approach creates a serious regress
problem for institutional design. Substantive approaches intended to
improve congressional deliberation must be addressed to a Congress
whose members do not all subscribe to that account, and who would
deliberate about the proposals themselves under diverse standards of
constitutional evaluation that the members hold. Congress is not an
institution noted for facing and resolving fundamental disagreements,
let alone abstract fundamental disagreements about constitutional
theory.
But Congress is an institution skilled at reaching specific agree-
ments that allow all parties to preserve their abstract commitments.
Our approach exploits this institutional strength. We will assess insti-
tutional-design proposals in part by their ability to improve Con-
gress’s constitutional performance relative to an “overlapping con-
58. RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 402-10 (2d ed. 1997).
59. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 44-46 (1997).
60. David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877,
884 (1996).
61. ELY, supra note 12, at 14-21.
62. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 95-96 (1986).
63. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT 4-5 (1999).
64. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 148-54 (1990).
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sensus”65 or “incompletely theorized agreement”66 about the criteria
for successful constitutional argument. Admissible proposals, in other
words, should identify improvements that are attractive to propo-
nents of all views.
Such consensual improvements should in principle be available
(however difficult they are to identify), because competing accounts
of constitutional interpretation display broad overlap along two di-
mensions: sources and outcomes. All of the major approaches to con-
stitutional interpretation, for example, agree that constitutional text is
relevant and admissible, agree that a broad range of potential tech-
niques for interpreting text are barred (interpreters must assume that
the text is written in English, that it has public rather than private or
coded meaning, and so forth), and that certain other techniques are
useful, such as the cautious use of canons of construction. The same is
true for precedent, or even more so. Every major approach, even Jus-
tice Scalia’s originalism, admits precedent as at least a side-constraint
on interpretive outcomes, and subscribes to the same hoary collection
of common-law techniques for interpreting unclear precedents.
As for outcomes, every interpretive theory professes to subscribe
to the small set of precedents that, like Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion,67 have achieved canonical status. But there are also more subtle
examples of overlapping consensus on outcomes. Consider the Sen-
ate’s decision not to censure President Clinton for the behavior on
which he was impeached but acquitted. That decision is justified by
clause-bound textualism and originalism, which identify conviction or
acquittal as the only permissible dispositions of a bill of impeachment,
and removal from office as a mandatory sanction upon conviction;68
by holistic constitutional interpretation of the law-as-integrity variety,
which finds censure offensive to principles underlying the Bill of At-
65. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 133-68 (1993).
66. Such a consensus has been described as follows:
[W]ell-functioning legal systems often tend to adopt a special strategy for producing
agreement amidst pluralism. Participants in legal controversies . . . agree on the result
and on relatively narrow or low-level explanations for it. They need not agree on fun-
damental principle. . . . The distinctive feature of this account is that it emphasizes
agreement on (relative) particulars rather than on (relative) abstractions.
Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 1735-36 (1995).
67. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
68. Jack Chaney, The Constitutionality of Censuring the President, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 979,
1004-12 (2000). But see Joseph Isenbergh, Impeachment and Presidential Immunity from Judicial
Process, 18 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 53, 86-93 (1999) (arguing that the Senate may impose lesser
sanctions upon conviction).
GARRETT & VERMEULE FINAL READ 04/30/01  3:38 PM
1296 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:1277
tainder Clause and related provisions;69 and by pragmatism, which
points to the potentially damaging consequences of introducing a new
weapon, of uncertain potency and application, into the arena of con-
gressional-executive conflict.70 If all of the major interpretive ap-
proaches agree upon a core set of interpretive sources, skills, and
even outcomes, then deliberative “error” can be defined relative to
that overlapping consensus without taking sides on fundamental ques-
tions. Proposals can be evaluated by their tendency to improve Con-
gress’s use of those sources and skills and to improve Congress’s abil-
ity to deliberate over hard cases, while avoiding outcomes that are
condemned by all constitutional approaches.
A serious question about this procedure is that the domain of
overlapping consensus might turn out to be too restricted, too banal,
to support useful institutional-design proposals. Perhaps the consen-
sus on sources only runs to bromides such as “read the text carefully”;
perhaps the consensus on outcomes only bars actions that no well-
functioning legislature would take anyway. Yet constitutional history
provides contrary examples, in which Congress approached a consti-
tutional question in a manner that finds little justification in any of
the major interpretive approaches. An unhappy counterpoint to the
Clinton impeachment is the impeachment of Andrew Johnson, in
which the House preferred charges, and the Senate came within one
vote of conviction, based on the constitutionally groundless charge
that Johnson had committed a “high” crime by discharging a cabinet
secretary. The discharge violated the Tenure of Office Act of 1867, by
which the Senate required the President obtain its consent to remov-
als as well as appointments, but there were no respectable textual,
originalist, or structural constitutional arguments in the Act’s favor,
and the Supreme Court later went out of its way to declare it uncon-
stitutional.71
The example is extreme. Possibly no institutional-design features
could have dampened the House Republicans’ impassioned partisan-
ship. Yet the Senate’s ultimate decision was in fact the constitution-
ally correct one, and the example shows that the domain of overlap-
69. Richard A. Posner, Dworkin, Polemics, and the Clinton Impeachment Controversy, 94
NW. U. L. REV. 1023, 1025-26 (2000).
70. RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE: THE INVESTIGATION, IMPEACHMENT,
AND TRIAL OF PRESIDENT CLINTON 194-95 (1999).
71. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926) (holding unconstitutional an 1876 act
which denied the President the unrestricted power to remove first-class Postmasters, and stating
in dicta that the Tenure of Office Act of 1867 violated the constitution).
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ping constitutional consensus is neither empty nor filled solely by ba-
nalities.
3. Transition Costs. The Constitution fixes some features of the
design of congressional institutions: bicameralism,72 the length of
terms in each house,73 and the impermissibility of state-imposed term
limits74 are examples. It also leaves many institutional features
unspecified, such as the committee structure, rules governing debate
that might allow or restrict the ability to filibuster or amend
proposals, the role of political parties in legislative organization, and
the size and organization of staff.75 In Part II we confine our proposals
to small-scale, feasible improvements, rather than large
restructurings.
One justification for this restriction is that controversial distribu-
tive implications will almost inevitably doom any proposed improve-
ment; minor restructurings, on the other hand, are less likely to inflict
large losses on any interested parties, and are thus more likely to gain
widespread support. Another justification is that congressional insti-
tutions are not infinitely plastic. Large-scale restructurings carry a
greater risk of harmful unintended consequences, and even if all goes
as planned, the costs of a large-scale transition from one institutional
arrangement to another will usually outweigh any gains in reduction
of decision costs or error costs. In general, folding in transition costs
limits our proposals roughly to the category of internal adjustments—
that is, adjustments that Congress can make without the consent of
any external actor, under the expansive constitutional power of each
house to “determine the Rules of its Proceedings.”76
D. Is Congress’s Constitutional Performance Optimal?
Even if the institutional-design question is the right one to ask,
and even if our three criteria for assessing Congress’s constitutional
performance are sensible, there remains the possibility that Con-
gress’s performance is already optimal. The view would not hold that
72. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (vesting legislative powers in a Congress consisting of the Senate
and House of Representatives).
73. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
74. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 783 (1995).
75. ESKRIDGE, FEREJOHN & VERMEULE, supra note 57, at 68-69 (describing congressional
institutions as falling along a spectrum of durability, with constitutional provisions serving as the
most durable).
76. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
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Congress never commits constitutional errors—episodes such as the
Johnson impeachment show otherwise—but would rather hold that
no cost-justified improvements in congressional performance are pos-
sible. This view follows from a simple account of the political incen-
tives that affect congressional deliberation. On this account, opposing
legislative coalitions will ventilate opposing constitutional arguments,
thereby ensuring fully adequate deliberation. Members who care to
do so may raise constitutional concerns during committee delibera-
tions or floor consideration without adopting a special procedure to
force such activity.
The view that Congress is optimally designed for constitutional
deliberation is surely counterintuitive, and we will argue that it is also
false. The final test of whether our proposals represent cost-justified
improvements in Congress’s procedures for constitutional delibera-
tion is the content of the proposals themselves, described later. But it
is worth noting here that the simple account suffers from numerous
conceptual and empirical difficulties.
First, the simple account assumes an implicit “fire-alarm” model77
of constitutional argument in Congress: coalitions and interest groups
monitor proposed bills and sound the alarm when they detect consti-
tutionally troublesome provisions or policies. Only when they hear
such an alarm will members of Congress turn their attention to the
problem; Congress thereby reduces the costs of monitoring legislative
proposals by externalizing those costs onto interested outsiders. But
there is no particular reason to believe, a priori, that legislators and
interest groups engage in just the right amount of monitoring if they
rely on post hoc fire alarms to trigger attention and discussion. To the
contrary, the empirical record suggests that Congress, as a collective
body that continually adjusts its own rules and procedures over time,
often rejects the fire-alarm model in favor of ex ante framework leg-
islation that structures congressional deliberation on constitutional
and policy questions.
For a policy example, consider the congressional budget process,
a comprehensive framework of procedural and substantive rules en-
acted by a series of laws, beginning with the Congressional Budget
and Impoundment Control Act of 197478 and including the Gramm-
77. Cf. Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked:
Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166 (1984) (using a fire-alarm model
in the context of congressional oversight of the executive branch agencies).
78. Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 601 (1994)).
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Rudman-Hollings Act of 1985,79 the Budget Enforcement Act of
1990,80 and the Balanced Budget Enforcement Act of 1997.81 Taken
together, these and related framework statutes structure Congress’s
fiscal decisionmaking so pervasively that they create something like a
fiscal constitution.82 For a recent and important example of frame-
work legislation addressed specifically to constitutional questions,
consider the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA),83
which requires congressional committees to specify, quantify, and de-
scribe any federal mandates that the proposed bill would impose on
state, local, and tribal governments and to identify those that are un-
funded by the federal government. The UMRA also allows legislators
to raise a point of order during floor deliberation in order to focus
debate on any unfunded mandate and to require a recorded vote to
waive the objection. In addition, the UMRA requires that each
House and Senate committee include a statement concerning pre-
emption of state, local, or tribal laws with each reported bill,84 in part
because of judicial requirements of clear statement and in part to en-
sure that attention is paid to this constitutional issue.
On this view, the UMRA is best understood as a species of col-
lective precommitment. It represents a judgment by legislators in
their collective capacity, outside the divisive context of specific pro-
posals, that fire-alarm monitoring of the federalism questions impli-
cated by unfunded mandates had provided insufficient consideration
for constitutional values. The widespread perception of interest
groups and lawmakers before passage of the UMRA was that Con-
gress enacted unfunded mandates in some cases without being aware
of their existence in an omnibus bill or in ignorance of their scope and
effect.85
It should not be surprising that legislators sometimes turn to ex
ante framework legislation in order to improve congressional per-
79. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99
Stat. 1037 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 900-908 (1994)).
80. Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388-573 (codified throughout 2 U.S.C. (1994)).
81. H.R. 898, 105th Cong. (1997).
82. See Kenneth W. Dam, The American Fiscal Constitution, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 271, 271
(1977) (constructing a general outline of the Amercian fiscal constitution); Kate Stith, Rewriting
the Fiscal Constitution: The Case of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, 76 CAL. L. REV. 593, 599 (1988)
(describing the constitutional budget process before and after Gramm-Rudman-Hollings).
83. Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48.
84. Pub. L. No. 104-4 § 423(e).
85. Elizabeth Garrett, Enhancing the Political Safeguards of Federalism? The Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1113, 1150 (1997).
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formance in constitutional settings. Fire-alarm monitoring will be
most successful in an arena dominated by organized and sophisticated
interest groups on all sides of an issue with clear and established lines
of communication to lawmakers with jurisdiction (environmental
policy, for example). As with unfunded mandates, however, constitu-
tional issues arise throughout the legislative arena, and affected
groups will lack the expertise to discover, analyze, and alert legisla-
tors about substantial questions of constitutionality. Therefore, when
a constitutional issue arises in an area that does not elicit strong and
competing interest-group activity, legislators cannot rely on outsiders
to sound the alarm. And as Congress does an increasing share of its
work through omnibus legislation, often running into hundreds of
provisions and thousands of pages, ignorance of constitutional impli-
cations becomes widespread both within Congress and among af-
fected groups.
Furthermore, even when some members are aware of a serious
constitutional objection, the chamber’s rules may bar public delibera-
tion on the issue. In the House of Representatives, for example, spe-
cial rules usually structure consideration of legislation and sharply
constrain members’ ability to raise objections or make amendments.86
Increasingly, some major legislation does not receive full considera-
tion by committees before enactment but is instead the product of
party task forces, leadership proposals finalized only during the rela-
tively nonpublic conference committee deliberations, or entirely pri-
vate interbranch summits that produce take-it-or-leave-it proposals
that are effectively protected from modification.87
Individual legislators could, in principle, address these deficien-
cies in the fire-alarm system by engaging in individual monitoring or
by privately expending the political capital needed to obtain full con-
sideration of constitutional issues. But in other deliberative contexts
legislators have responded to the inadequacies of the fire-alarm
model through collective action, such as the UMRA, because delib-
eration within the Congress constitutes a collective good. All legisla-
86. STANLEY BACH & STEVEN S. SMITH, MANAGING UNCERTAINTY IN THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES: ADAPTATION AND INNOVATION IN SPECIAL RULES 113 (1988).
87. For discussions of these new legislative processes, which are becoming commonplace
for major initiatives, see generally JOHN B. GILMOUR, STRATEGIC DISAGREEMENT:
STALEMATE IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1995) (discussing strategies of congressional negotiations
and advising politicians against stalemate tactics when it would delay helpful legislation);
BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN THE U.S.
CONGRESS (2000) (illustrating the contemporary legislative process with various case studies).
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tors benefit when a particular legislator spends time developing in-
formation, analyzing constitutional questions, and working with spe-
cialized personal staff on constitutional issues. Yet if an individual
member provides those benefits, she has taken time away from the
tasks that contribute directly to her reelection. She loses time for
fundraising, casework, media appearances, and obtaining particular-
ized spending projects in her district; she will thus be at a disadvan-
tage and receive less of the pie of limited federal resources unless all
members of Congress spend a similar amount of their time on consti-
tutional issues. If constitutional deliberation is an individually sup-
plied good, individual legislators do not internalize all of the benefits
of constitutional deliberation but do shoulder the costs. In such a sys-
tem, constitutional deliberation will be underproduced.
In the face of the public-good character of constitutional delib-
eration, all members would benefit from a system that requires law-
makers to allocate some of their scarce time to the consideration of
constitutional issues, that provides collective funding for the staff re-
quired for this deliberation, and that enforces collective commitments
that support deliberation. The constitutional framework we propose,
like the UMRA, seeks to solve the collective-action problem and en-
force the institutional commitment to spend some time and resources
on these matters. Not infinite time and resources, of course; although
legislators value a process that provides the opportunity for focused
and serious deliberation about difficult constitutional issues, they also
have other substantive objectives and value other collective activities.
As we have argued, institutional-design proposals must take opportu-
nity costs into account in calibrating the incentives for legislators’ de-
liberation on constitutional questions.
There are few promising alternatives to this sort of ex ante
framework legislation. In the constitutional setting, Congress lacks a
familiar tool that it often uses to sidestep similar problems in policy
settings: delegation to administrative agencies. In areas in which de-
tailed policy expertise is a collective good, one that legislators shirk
on supplying to their colleagues, Congress can pass generally worded
statutes that delegate policymaking to executive branch agencies. If
all members would prefer to promote new technologies that produce
clean air at a low cost, but members face collective-action problems in
acquiring the expertise necessary to achieve that objective, they can
delegate regulatory authority to the Environmental Protection
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Agency—a course of action that, of course, creates new issues in
turn.88
Delegating the duty to deliberate about and determine constitu-
tional issues is more difficult. In most cases, Congress cannot be sure
that affected interest groups will be able to challenge the law in court,
or that the Supreme Court will have the capacity and inclination to
act as an impartial arbiter of constitutional disagreements between
congressional coalitions. There is some evidence that Congress has at-
tempted to delegate certain problematic and controversial constitu-
tional problems to the Supreme Court, through expedited-review
provisions that require the Court to take cases attacking the constitu-
tionality of an enactment and to do so early in the judicial process,
perhaps before any other appellate review.89 This emerging practice
has been attacked on a variety of grounds;90 for our purposes here, it
is enough to observe that the limited capacity of the judicial branch
precludes Congress from adopting delegation in the constitutional
context as a complete solution to its collective-action problem.
In short, the objection that constitutional deliberation without a
collective deliberative structure is optimal—that the fire-alarm model
of constitutional objections raised by individual legislators cannot be
improved upon—is the same objection heard in the context of other
recent structural innovations like the congressional budget process or
88. Broad delegations are the subject of much scholarly and political criticism. E.g., DAVID
SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE
THROUGH DELEGATION passim (1993) (discussing the benefits and costs of delegation and ar-
guing that effective regulation is possible without delegation); Marci A. Hamilton, Representa-
tion and Nondelegation: Back to Basics, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 807 passim (1999) (discussing
legislative and executive delegation and arguing that the nondelegation doctrine should be re-
vived). But see Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political De-
cisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81 passim (1985) (arguing that nondelegation critics are mis-
guided); David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89
GEO. L.J. 97 passim (2000) (arguing that agency policymaking is democratically legitimate).
Some in Congress advocate adopting a collective framework to improve deliberation about
delegations of regulatory authority, sometimes called “private mandates” by those who seek to
reduce the number and scope of delegations. E.g., Mandates Information Act of 1999, H.R. 350,
106th Cong., S. 427, 106th Cong. (intended to “improve Congressional deliberation on proposed
Federal private sector mandates”); CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, AN ASSESSMENT OF
THE UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT IN 1999, at 14-15 (2000) (discussing proposals that
would affect deliberation of private mandates).
89. Line Item Veto Act, 2 U.S.C. § 691d (1994) (repealed in 1998, following Clinton v. City
of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 447-49 (1998) (holding that the Line Item Veto Act violated the
Presentment Clause by departing from “finely wrought” constitutional procedures for the en-
actment of law)).
90. E.g., Neal Devins & Michael A. Fitts, The Triumph of Timing: Raines v. Byrd and the
Modern Supreme Court’s Attempt to Control Constitutional Confrontations, 86 GEO. L.J. 351,
353-55 (1997) (discussing the importance of delay in maintaining the separation of powers).
GARRETT & VERMEULE FINAL READ 04/30/01  3:38 PM
2001] DESIGN OF A THAYERIAN CONGRESS 1303
the UMRA.91 Members could have passed balanced budgets, or re-
duced federal spending, or refrained from imposing unfunded man-
dates, simply by dint of individual effort, without adopting compre-
hensive deliberative structures. But in all these contexts, members
decided that they needed collective precommitments to ensure the
production of relevant information and to encourage and channel
helpful activity by legislators and interest groups. A realistic picture
of Congress, the one to which we subscribe, portrays it as an institu-
tion that both engages in substantive deliberation in specific contexts
and also has some collective capacity for self-assessment, that strug-
gles over time to adjust its own procedures for constitutional delibera-
tion, and that is willing to consider, in its collective capacity, proposals
for deliberative improvement. We advance proposals of that sort in
the next part.
II.  LEGISLATIVE RULES OF ADMINISTRATION: DESIGN FEATURES
OF A THAYERIAN CONGRESS
A. Some Principles of Design
As we describe the design features of a Congress able to dis-
charge its constitutional responsibilities more effectively, we have
been guided by four design principles that implement the necessary
tradeoffs between decision costs, error costs, and transition costs.
First, members of Congress must have adequate information about
constitutional issues raised by legislation. They need to know at an
early stage when a proposal implicates a significant constitutional is-
sue, and then they require analysis of the substance of the issue. The
information should be presented in a way that non-lawyers can un-
derstand and that is also accessible for constituents and interest
groups. Finally, members may want to develop comprehensive infor-
mation about congressional consideration of constitutional issues
over time, and perhaps also about constitutional implications of laws
passed before the adoption of any comprehensive framework, so that
they can make ongoing alterations in the new deliberative framework
to address gaps or failings.
91. Elizabeth Garrett, Accountability and Restraint: The Federal Budget Process and the
Line Item Veto Act, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 871, 889-90 (1998) (explaining the collective action
problem in a budget context); Garrett, supra note 85, at 1132-33 (explaining the problem in the
UMRA context).
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Second, members must be afforded an opportunity to raise con-
stitutional issues and to deliberate about them fully. Such opportuni-
ties may be most important at the committee level, where information
is developed, hearings are held, and sustained and focused discussion
among members is possible. But members also need opportunities for
focused deliberation of constitutional issues when a bill reaches the
floor, especially in the House of Representatives, which usually con-
siders major legislation under closed or modified closed rules denying
most members the chance to amend the bill or to raise points of or-
der. Although members will inevitably discuss issues with each other
in private settings, the institutional structure should ensure that most
debate takes place publicly and is available to members and constitu-
ents before final decisions are made.
Third, the institutional design should encourage very broad in-
volvement from experts and interested parties. Members of Congress
should be able to receive advice and analysis from the executive
branch, representatives of diverse and competing interest groups, and
legal experts in the academy and the bar. Such input should be pro-
vided in ways that make it accessible to all lawmakers and to the pub-
lic. Transparent deliberation and accessible information are vital to
the way the public views the process; open procedures providing full
participation can confer legitimacy on outcomes and encourage public
acceptance even among those opposed on the merits.92 Congress
should also develop internal expertise to assess information provided
by outsiders and to produce additional analysis when necessary.
Fourth, the congressional structure for the consideration of con-
stitutional questions should reflect a balance between the need to im-
prove legislative capacity to discharge Congress’s responsibility in this
area and the need to enact legislation without undue delay or extreme
difficulty. Process can produce better legislative outcomes, provide
opportunities for transparent debate that allows for congressional ac-
countability, and increase the information available to decisionmak-
ers. Procedures can also be so unwieldy and burdensome that they
obstruct the enactment of legislation or provide determined minori-
ties excessive power to delay, kill or modify proposals. Moreover,
92. Cf. Heather J. Smith & Tom R. Tyler, Justice and Power: When Will Justice Concerns
Encourage the Advantaged to Support Policies Which Redistribute Economic Resources and the
Disadvantaged to Willingly Obey the Law?, 26 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCH. 171, 173 (1996) (discussing
how fair methods and procedures can lead people to sacrifice short-term personal gains in the
long-term interest of the greater good).
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process can be used strategically by those unconcerned with constitu-
tional issues to derail bills that they oppose on other grounds.
B. Scope of the Proposals
Taken as an integrated package, our recommendations produce a
set of legislative rules that serve as a Congressional Framework for
Constitutional Issues. Before setting out the details of the Frame-
work, one general question is whether the Framework should be lim-
ited to the areas of constitutional law in which judicial review is non-
existent or occurs only at the level of rational-basis review93—that is,
areas in which Congress is our de jure or de facto final constitutional
decisionmaker, as discussed in Part I—or instead should encompass
any relevant constitutional questions. We have chosen the latter
course, for reasons suggested by the mechanics of, and tradeoffs in-
herent in, institutional design.
In Part I, we argued that improving Congress’s constitutional
performance will produce the greatest gains with respect to judicially
unreviewed questions of constitutional law. But it is a mistake to as-
sume that the scope of the implementing framework must be pre-
cisely tailored to the impetus for proposing it. Across legal domains,
the imperatives of institutional design—considerations of decision
costs, of the relative attractiveness, in particular settings, of imple-
mentation by rules and implementation by standards, and of the reac-
tions of relevant interest groups—cause doctrines to assume a shape
that is partially independent of their underlying justifications. In the
present setting, as in others, the question is whether the costs of tai-
loring the Framework more narrowly outweigh the benefits.
The costs of tailoring would be very high. The set of constitu-
tional issues not reviewed by the judicial branch is a constantly
evolving list. At some points in our recent history, for example, the
courts declined to stringently review cases raising issues of federalism;
currently, many (but not all) such cases receive close scrutiny.94 Any
framework limited in scope to a particular set of identified issues
would require constant amendment by Congress to account for
changes in judicial practice. If these costs are so high that tailoring
93. See supra notes 22-37 and accompanying text (listing types of controversies in which
courts rarely, if ever, intervene).
94. Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism,
100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 287-93 (2000) (discussing and criticizing the Court’s recent attempts to
“roll back federal power to what it meant at the Founding”).
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simply proves infeasible, then the choice is an easy one between a
general framework for congressional review, on the one hand, and the
inadequate level of congressional review that currently obtains, on
the other. Even assuming that tailoring is not prohibitively costly, the
price is probably not worth paying. It is difficult to identify any sub-
stantial costs of a general framework (that is, any serious benefits of
tailoring), because the principal effect of a general framework is sim-
ply to ensure that both Congress and the judiciary give serious con-
sideration to constitutional issues in domains of legislation subject to
judicial review.
To be sure, on a theory of judicial supremacy akin to that of Al-
exander and Schauer, perhaps congressional consideration of consti-
tutional issues is affirmatively bad. Perhaps vigorous congressional
review for constitutionality would even cause the tradition of inde-
pendent judicial review to atrophy, as judges more frequently defer to
congressional decisions or deny standing to parties seeking judicial
review. This concern is just the converse of Thayer’s concern that ag-
gressive judicial review would cause legislators to evade responsibility
for constitutional compliance by passing constitutional questions to
the courts.
But the normative and empirical premises of this objection are
both dubious. Normatively, most mainstream theories of constitu-
tionalism deem congressional review for constitutionality to be an af-
firmative good, regardless of the scope of subsequent judicial review.
Empirically, the objection at most establishes that the institutional
designer must trade off the benefits from a general framework against
the possible costs of judicial lassitude in areas previously subject to
judicial oversight. That tradeoff cashes out in favor of a general
framework for congressional deliberation on constitutional issues, for
the reason emphasized in Part I: the domain of effective congres-
sional supremacy, in which a general framework would at least pro-
vide some constitutional review (in preference to the inadequate cur-
rent level), is large and arguably more consequential than the
remaining areas of judicial review, in which a general framework
might dilute the existing high level of constitutional review. Not only
do effectively unreviewed issues form a major part of congressional
activity, some laws that implicate constitutional issues on which judi-
cial review is theoretically available may in fact never be reviewed by
a court. Perhaps no one will have standing to bring a challenge, or no
one with the resources to litigate will be interested in bringing a chal-
lenge. Or perhaps the review will take place years after passage,
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leaving a constitutionally problematic law ensconced in the U.S. Code
during the interim period.
In sum, the costs of a general framework are both speculative
and probably inconsequential, while the benefits of a general frame-
work are impressive. It bears emphasis, however, that it would not be
inconsistent with our argument to limit the Framework to the set of
constitutional decisions on which judicial review is not available, nor
is such a limited procedural framework unprecedented. The UMRA
contains a list of exceptions to its coverage which somewhat circum-
scribes its scope.95 In what follows, we will not only set out a general
framework, but also glance in passing at design options that might be
employed to narrow its scope.
C. The Congressional Framework for Constitutional Issues
1. Production and Dissemination of Information. As we
explained previously, in some cases, Congress may neglect its
responsibility to consider constitutional issues, because members are
not aware that a proposal has constitutional ramifications. Relying on
a fire-alarm system of review may be insufficiently systematic.
Fortunately, models for more regularized notice exist. The most
influential and ubiquitous procedural framework designed to produce
and structure information is the congressional budget process.96 A
recent addition to the budget rules, the UMRA, requires that the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) provide authorizing committees
written statements identifying federal mandates in reported bills.
With respect to mandates that exceed certain thresholds, CBO must
provide more detailed information about the costs to state and local
governments or to the private sector. Similarly, for tax bills, the Joint
Tax Committee (JTC) provides revenue estimates for all provisions
and tax complexity analyses for provisions with widespread
applicability to individuals and businesses.97
A modern committee report contains a great deal of mandatory
information—some required by budget rules, some by other congres-
95. 2 U.S.C. § 1503 (1994) (listing seven exceptions including provisions enforcing individ-
ual constitutional rights, civil rights laws, emergency laws, and law relating to social security).
96. Elizabeth Garrett, Rethinking the Structures of Decisionmaking in the Federal Budget
Process, 35 HARV. J. LEGIS. 387 passim (1998) (describing the effective structuring of current
budget decisions).
97. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206,
112 Stat. 685, §§ 4021-4022 (1998).
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sional rules—designed to address systematic gaps in information or to
provide information to lawmakers who do not serve on the special-
ized committee and thus might overlook important aspects of policy.98
In the House, for example, each committee report contains relevant
oversight findings and recommendations made by the Committee on
Government Reform, cost estimates (including any new budget
authority, spending authority, or changes in tax laws), a statement of
the constitutional authority supporting enactment of the bill, an esti-
mate of the costs of any federal mandate on subnational govern-
ments, a description and explanation of any such mandate, and a pre-
emption statement.99 The Senate Rules require committee reports to
include, in addition to the statements required by the UMRA, cost es-
timates, an evaluation of the numbers of individuals and businesses
that would be regulated by the bill, the economic impact of such
regulations, a privacy determination, and a statement describing any
additional paperwork burdens.100
With respect to a similar framework for the consideration of con-
stitutional issues, identifying bills that implicate constitutional ques-
tions must occur early so committees with jurisdiction can hold hear-
ings and gather further information about the issue. The
parliamentarian, typically a distinguished lawyer with a reputation for
nonpartisanship,101 can determine at the time of referral to committee
whether a proposal appears to raise a significant constitutional issue.
The referral decision, which is published in the Congressional Record,
can also contain the parliamentarian’s description of any constitu-
tional issue. Identification at this time is necessary if a specialized
committee will have some role in the deliberation, perhaps through
joint or sequential referral,102 and it is desirable no matter what com-
mittee structure is chosen. For example, an early statement will alert
98. Stephen F. Ross, Legislative Enforcement of Equal Protection, 72 MINN. L. REV. 311,
359 (1987) (“Full disclosure [in committee reports] may prevent legislators with less expertise in
the subject area from unconstitutionally supporting the bill or its alternatives without being
cognizant of the bill’s purpose.”).
99. House Committee on Rules (106th Cong.), A PRIMER ON COMMITTEE REPORTS,
http://www.house.gov/rules/comm_rep_primer.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2001) (on file with the
Duke Law Journal).
100. S. DOC. NO. 106-15 (2000) (listing the standing rules of the Senate regarding committee
report requirements), http://www.senate.gov/learning/learn_rules.html#26 (on file with the Duke
Law Journal).
101. DAVID C. KING, TURF WARS: HOW CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES CLAIM
JURISDICTION 80-85 (1997).
102. See infra notes 132-43 and accompanying text (discussing various committee struc-
tures).
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groups interested in the underlying bill or in the constitutional issue
that they should take part in the subsequent deliberations.
In some cases, constitutional issues will arise as the proposal is
considered and amended; thus, the trigger for special procedures
should occur not only at the initial referral but remain available
throughout the committee process. If an issue is identified after bill
referral, the parliamentarian will be alerted (and perhaps will amend
his referral decision) and a statement identifying the issue will be in-
cluded in the Congressional Record. The identification process is an
ongoing one that proceeds as the bill is refined, reshaped, and rewrit-
ten; the failure of the parliamentarian to identify an issue at the out-
set of its consideration should not be interpreted as a conclusive
finding that the bill does not implicate constitutional issues.
Determining what constitutes a “significant” constitutional issue
will be tricky; after all, virtually all proposals affect some aspect of the
constitutional structure at least marginally. For example, all regula-
tory statutes raise some element of the nondelegation principle, and
many implicate federalism issues. Requiring the parliamentarian to
frame the issue he flags in general terms demonstrates the signifi-
cance of the issue and helps to define it for the committee and staff.
In a sense, this issue identification is similar to the Supreme Court’s
framing of a question on which it grants certiorari, although in the
congressional context we expect that the understanding of the issue
may change substantially as more information is developed. Unlike
the Supreme Court when it deliberates a petition for certiorari, the
parliamentarian will have no record of proceedings from other insti-
tutions or helpful briefs filed by opposing parties. Instead, he will
have only the text of the bill, which is likely to be modified substan-
tially, and perhaps the statement that the member delivered or in-
serted into the Congressional Record when the bill was introduced.
In addition, the parliamentarian will specifically identify any con-
stitutional issues implicated by the proposal that are issues the judici-
ary declines to review or reviews only under a rational-basis standard.
Such identification will alert members of Congress to their special re-
sponsibility with respect to these bills. Initially, the parliamentarian
may want to rely on a nonpartisan group of constitutional experts to
provide guidelines for this process and to update the list of issues that
receive very little or no judicial scrutiny.103 Moreover, any ongoing re-
103. MORGAN, supra note 17, at 349 (emphasizing the importance of identifying and defin-
ing the constitutional issue and suggesting a bipartisan commission of experts).
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view of the process by expert congressional staff should include as-
sessment of this aspect of the Framework with suggestions for further
refinement.
As we will discuss below, additional information will be gener-
ated during committee consideration of bills, and in some cases the
constitutional issue will become apparent only after some committee
work. To provide members the data required for them to make in-
formed decisions when the bill reaches the floor, every bill will be ac-
companied by a constitutional impact statement. The constitutional
impact statement will provide a summary of the committee’s findings
on the proposal’s constitutional implications. If there is no significant
constitutional issue raised by the bill, the statement will include that
information. The constitutional impact statement will refer to any
more comprehensive analyses (perhaps records of public hearings or
analyses prepared by expert staff), and it will contain any dissenting
views. The constitutional impact statement will be written so that
non-lawyers can understand the arguments, not only because many
members and most constituents are not lawyers, but also because the
institutional strength of Congress is not its attention to legalisms but
its expertise in the policy aspects of constitutional decisions. These
statements, written by the committee with the assistance of expert
staff,104 will either be included in the committee report itself or be
provided to Congress as soon as practicable after the report is filed.
Because conference reports can raise new constitutional issues (al-
though only infrequently because conference committees are formally
limited to considering provisions that passed one of the houses or
variations on the provisions), staff will also analyze conference re-
ports and include or update constitutional impact statements before
floor consideration.
Constitutional impact statements will be more detailed than the
parliamentarian’s initial framing of the issue. The burden on drafters
will not be excessive, however, because statements will be required
only with respect to reported bills, a much smaller universe of legisla-
tion. The constitutional impact statements should not be boilerplate
declarations (as some of the currently required statements in congres-
sional reports have become), except in the case of a finding that the
legislation does not implicate a significant constitutional issue. Oth-
erwise, the statement will be a brief summary of the constitutional is-
104. See infra notes 115-28 and accompanying text (discussing the development of expert
staff in Congress to deal with constitutional issues).
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sue, together with the committee’s views and any dissenting views. If
the constitutional issues raised by the proposal are ones that the judi-
ciary declines to review, the statement will identify them as such in
order to signal to legislators that their deliberation and decision on
these constitutional questions are likely to be the final determina-
tions.
The constitutional impact statements will consolidate and extend
some of the other reporting requirements related to constitutional is-
sues. The current requirements for committee reports to include a
statement of the constitutional authority for congressional action (in
House reports) and to include a statement concerning preemption of
state laws (from the UMRA), which are both constitutional state-
ments, will be incorporated into the larger constitutional impact
statement. To respond to judicial requirements for clear statements in
a number of quasi-constitutional areas, the statements will also de-
clare whether provisions in the bill are severable, identify any retroac-
tive provisions, and provide other clear statements required by the
judiciary,105 a category that may evolve over time as the jurisprudence
of interpretive rules of clear statement changes.
Finally, there will be explicit statements declaring whether the
legislation allows a pre-implementation challenge to its constitution-
ality and whether any constitutional challenge receives special or ex-
pedited judicial consideration. Recently, statutes like the flag-burning
law106 and the Line Item Veto Act107 have included special provisions
to obtain early judicial, and specifically Supreme Court, determina-
tions of constitutional issues, almost like advisory opinions. It appears
that these provisions have encouraged lawmakers to shirk their duty
to play an active role in constitutional construction and to pass laws
about which many have serious doubts in the hope that the courts will
correct any errors.108 They should therefore be flagged so that they do
not escape congressional and public attention.
To ensure that a constitutional impact statement is produced for
all legislation, any bill that comes to the floor without such a state-
105. William Eskridge, Jr. & Philip Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement
Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 598-611 (1992).
106. Flag Protection Act of 1989, 18 U.S.C. § 700 (1994) (declared unconstitutional in
United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 319 (1990)).
107. 2 U.S.C. §§ 691-692 (1994) (declared unconstitutional in Clinton v. City of New York,
524 U.S. 417 (1998)).
108. Devins & Fitts, supra note 90, at 356-57 (describing congressional efforts to expedite
Supreme Court review of the constitutionality of the Line Item Veto Act).
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ment will be subject to a point of order, waivable only by a majority
vote.109 Enforcement is vital. Before the UMRA was enacted, Con-
gress was required to produce fiscal notes containing information on
the costs imposed on state and local governments, but that require-
ment was often ignored or complied with well after floor considera-
tion.110 Requiring information without also providing a sanction will
result in little information, as members and staff target limited re-
sources on higher priority issues. We will return to the point-of-order
enforcement procedures below when we focus on the rules governing
floor consideration.
Congress should also require that expert staff produce more
comprehensive reports. Annual reports assessing the experience un-
der the new Framework can provide information necessary to adjust
the Framework or to improve the deliberative process. Congress pro-
duces such assessments of performance under the UMRA,111 and the
reports aid lawmakers, committee staff, and expert staff in their con-
tinuing efforts to interpret vague provisions in the UMRA, to allocate
appropriate resources, and to gauge whether the procedure has af-
fected behavior and outcomes. The proposed Federalism Act of 1999,
which would expand current requirements for preemption statements
and require broader federalism impact assessments, would also re-
quire the CBO to prepare biannual comprehensive assessments of all
federal statutes preempting state or local laws.112
One aspect of Congress’s constitutional performance that all this
data ignores is past performance, which may have provided insuffi-
cient attention to constitutional issues that will never be reviewed by
the judiciary. Most of the procedural frameworks like the UMRA or
the congressional budget process are primarily forward-looking; any
requirements for reassessments of enacted legislation receive little if
any of Congress’s limited attention and resources. Although, in a per-
fect world unaffected by information and other costs, such retrospec-
tive analyses would be helpful and might prompt legislative reconsid-
109. See infra notes 150-54 and accompanying text (discussing our point-of-order proposal).
110. Garrett, supra note 85, at 1160-63 (contrasting the fiscal notes process with the
UMRA’s information requirements and enforcement provisions).
111. See generally CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 88 (reporting UMRA ac-
tivity in 1999). Such reports, which are helpful to lawmakers, interest groups, and scholars have
been issued every year since the enactment of the UMRA. Id. at iii (“This paper is the fourth
annual assessment of the Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO’s) activities under the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act (UMRA).”).
112. H.R. 2245, 106th Cong. § 10(c) (1999).
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eration,113 we believe resources will be more effectively used if di-
rected at future proposals.
2. Expert Congressional Staff on Constitutional Issues. The
modern Congress increasingly relies on others to provide information
and analysis necessary for decisionmaking, and it will do so in this
context as well. Some members of Congress will arrive in Washington
with substantial legal knowledge, and some will become experts on
constitutional matters during the terms of office. Nevertheless, even
learned and sophisticated legal experts in Congress will require help,
and most members will depend heavily on others. Some of the
information will be produced by interest groups, particularly if early
identification of a significant constitutional issue alerts groups to the
need for their involvement. Outside production of information does
not eliminate the need for internal production, however. First,
Congress will need to assess the value of information from parties
with a stake in the legislative outcome. Increasingly, even think tanks,
which are generally thought of as unaffiliated with particular interest
groups although associated with particular ideological commitments,
are funded by private entities and used as more neutral-appearing
surrogates on Capitol Hill.114 Expert staff can analyze information
from third parties and use credible information and good arguments
in their own work, thereby externalizing some of the information
costs. Second, experts can study issues neglected by outside groups,
provide balanced perspective in areas where there are not well-
matched competing interest groups, and respond to particular
requests by members of Congress.
The idea of creating a body of trained professional staff to help
in this area is consistent with larger institutional trends in the legisla-
tive branch. Over the last century, as Congress has become more pro-
fessional and the issues it faces more complex, the number of staff has
113. But see Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Peter W. Huber, The Intercircuit Committee, 100
HARV. L. REV. 1417, 1430 (1987) (advocating a “system of legislative review and revision under
which Congress would take a second look at a law once a court opinion or two highlighted the
measure’s infirmities”).
114. Andrew Rich & R. Kent Weaver, Advocates and Analysts: Think Tanks and the Politi-
cization of Expertise, in INTEREST GROUP POLITICS 235, 241-42 (Allan J. Cigler & Burdette A.
Loomis eds., 5th ed. 1998) (describing “advocacy tanks”); Dan Morgan, Think Tanks: Corpora-
tion’s Quiet Weapon, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 2000, at A1 (describing undisclosed corporate con-
tributions to think tanks).
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increased substantially.115 Moreover, Congress occasionally establishes
an internal body of experts to counterbalance expertise in the other
branches of government. Thus, Congress created the CBO so that the
legislative branch can deal more successfully with the executive
branch, which includes the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) and countless budget experts in the agencies. Frank Easter-
brook, among others, has noted that the President often has signifi-
cant influence on constitutional and other legal matters because he is
assisted by the Attorney General, the Solicitor General, their staffs,
and the staff of the Office of Legal Counsel.116 If Congress wants to
step out of the shadows of the judicial and executive branches with
regard to constitutional determinations, it must establish an equiva-
lent set of experts.
Although each member could hire a constitutional expert for her
staff (and many members already hire lawyers as policy aides), that
strategy is a more costly route than setting up an entity like the CBO
or the JTC staff that is funded collectively and that may be able to at-
tract and retain more skilled and better-trained professionals.117 Al-
ternatively, and particularly if the Judiciary Committees were given
jurisdiction over all bills that implicate significant constitutional is-
sues, the staffs of these committees could provide expertise. Individ-
ual members might resist this proposal because the staff of the Judici-
ary Committees is seen as closely tied to the chairs and ranking
members of the committees, rather than as resources for the entire
Congress. Furthermore, when Congress begins to play a larger role in
areas that are viewed by the public as somewhat nonpartisan, mem-
bers sometimes adopt an institutional framework that allows them to
rely on technical experts who are somewhat insulated from the vaga-
ries of politics to produce information that will shape the partisan de-
bate. Such a framework permits lawmakers to gain credibility with
115. In 1972, the total personal and standing committee staff in the House was 5,982; in the
Senate the total was 3,061. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 294 (1999). In 1995, the total in the House was 8,432, and in the Senate, the total was
4,979. Id. Those figures do not include expert staff in the CBO, the Congressional Research
Service, and other affiliated institutions. Id.
116. Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 916-17
(1990).
117. Even if a separate entity is formed to provide expert advice to all members, members
may still assign someone in their personal office to focus on constitutional issues. That sort of
reaction often occurs so that members can have a trusted agent monitor the credibility of the
information they are receiving from congressional actors not so closely aligned with the individ-
ual lawmaker’s political future. This change is still less costly for members because personal
staff perform a monitoring function that requires less expertise and less time.
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constituents because they appear to be basing policy on relatively
neutral information. For example, even when JTC revenue estimates
made it more difficult for members to pursue policy objectives such as
reductions in the capital-gains tax, lawmakers did not fire the staff,
nor did they require that the experts use dynamic revenue estimating
despite JTC’s professional objections to such methodologies. Legisla-
tors certainly brought pressure to bear on the technocrats and sought
to convince them to alter the assumptions used in their projections.
But, frustrated as they were, legislators understood that, on balance,
it served members’ interests to rely on projections produced by com-
petent and respected economists, rather than solely on information
emanating from political operatives.118
Many of the expert entities created by Congress reflect an ac-
commodation between the desire to have politics affect the informa-
tion generated and the need to appear to rely on balanced and rela-
tively nonpartisan data in policymaking. Thus, Congress often adopts
an institutional arrangement where the head of the organization is
appointed by congressional leaders for discrete terms of office,119 but
the staff consists mainly of career professionals. Moreover, the inter-
play of political forces and public deliberation exert some pressure to
appoint a more moderate and ideologically balanced director than
party leaders might prefer.120 But, as with executive branch agencies,
118. Interestingly, the issue of “static” versus dynamic revenue estimating was raised again
by Representative Phil Crane in his unsuccessful effort to be named Chair of the Ways and
Means Committee. In his campaign, he argued that the Joint Committee had become too inde-
pendent and nonpartisan, acting more like the CBO or GAO. Warren Rojas, JCT “Static”
Scoring Draws Heat from W&M Chair Candidate, TAX NOTES 1667, 1667 (2000). This rhetoric
demonstrates that members view congressional staff as falling along a spectrum of independ-
ence.
119. The CBO directors appointed by the Republicans when they took control of the Con-
gress reflected the Republicans’ ideology. Eric Pianin, June O’Neill to Depart CBO Early: Em-
battled Director to Return to Academia, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 1998, at A25 (noting that Repub-
licans were unlikely to reappoint O’Neill because she had not made the changes they wanted to
help their policy agenda); Alyssa J. Rubin, Congressional Appointments: Conservative O’Neill Is
in Line to Run Hill Budget Office, 53 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 360, 360 (1995) (noting that the
first CBO director appointed by Republicans is “clearly in the conservative camp”). Indeed, one
of the appointees, Dan Crippen, was unusual because his background was mainly as a political
operative rather than as an economist or public policy expert. George Hager, Former GOP Aide
Is Choice to Lead Hill Budget Office, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 1999, at A25 (describing Crippen’s
background); Melindah Musa, The Congressional Budget Office in the Federal Budget Process
3 n.11 (Mar. 3, 1999) (describing Crippen as a “seemingly partisan candidate”) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal).
120. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, A PROFILE OF THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
OFFICE 13 (1990) (reporting that the appointment of Robert Reischauer was delayed for two
years because of heated debate about his ability to be nonpartisan).
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lawmakers can bring political pressure to bear on staff through fund-
ing decisions and jawboning.121
Different congressional agencies have different reputations for
independence. The General Accounting Office and Congressional
Research Service (CRS) are often seen as the most independent and
neutral;122 the CBO and the JTC are seen as more closely affiliated
with party leaders although still maintaining a substantial degree of
independence and even-handedness; and committee staffs are closely
affiliated with politicians and ideology. This diversity of staff leads to
more balanced presentation of information. Overlapping responsibili-
ties allow these entities to check each other through a sort of profes-
sional competition;123 thus, an economist in CRS will produce a report
on capital-gains taxes that might call into question the work done by
the JTC, and a staff member of the Joint Economic Committee will
disseminate a more partisan argument concerning the economic ef-
fects of the tax.
There are several options for a structure to provide information
to all members of Congress. First, Congress could expand the duties
of existing entities and provide additional staff.124 For example, each
house has an Office of Legal Counsel, established in the 1970s.125 The
duties of the counsel revolve around representing the House and
Senate in court and defending the constitutionality and legality of
congressional enactments, subpoenas, and other legislative actions.
The Offices of Legislative Counsel assist members in drafting legisla-
tion, but currently the counsel do not formally advise lawmakers
121. E.g., Nancy D. Kates et al., Starting from Scratch: Alice Rivlin and the Congressional
Budget Office 13-14 (1989) (describing Congress’s decision to slash CBO’s budget in an attempt
to discipline the first director) (on file at the John F. Kennedy School of Government Library,
Harvard University).
122. There was a much greater outcry when the Republican Congress appeared to bring par-
tisan pressure to bear on some units of CRS, for example, than when the leadership appointed
CBO directors with conservative viewpoints. E.g., Heidi Glenn, Uncertainty Swirls Around CRS
Reorganization, 81 TAX NOTES 1455, 1455 (1990) (reporting speculation that the reorganization
was done to dilute the Service’s analyses after it had issued too many controversial reports).
123. Id. at 1455-56 (describing differences in the entities’ responsibilities).
124. A number of states have relatively nonpartisan officials who advise legislators about
judicial opinions that affect legislation, drafting, and important legal issues raised by pending or
enacted legislation. These offices essentially combine the functions of the federal Offices of
Legislative Counsel and the Congressional Research Service and provide additional advice con-
cerning revision and codification. Shirley S. Abrahamson & Robert L. Hughes, Shall We Dance?
Steps for Legislators and Judges in Statutory Interpretation, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1045, 1061-70
(1991).
125. Charles Tiefer, The Senate and House Counsel Offices: Dilemmas of Representing in
Court the Institutional Congressional Client, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 48-49 (Spring
1998).
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about the constitutionality of their proposals, restricting their advice
mainly to drafting issues.126 To place this new task within the jurisdic-
tion of either of these offices would work a fundamental change in
their jobs and require significant additional staff.
The duties of the American Law Division of the Congressional
Research Service could be expanded so that the staff would consult
more extensively and regularly with Congress on constitutional issues.
Now, analysts provide testimony and written analysis when requested;
the division functions as a “law office for Congress” with 65 attorneys,
paralegals, and support staff.127 The option of relying on CRS staff is
unlikely to appeal to lawmakers in the context of the new constitu-
tional framework, however. CRS is perceived as an extremely neutral
entity with few if any partisan connections (although individual ana-
lysts can develop a reputation for particular perspectives associated
with political ideologies). Although nonpartisanship is sometimes
perceived as an asset, in this context, members are apt to want some
closer connection between political considerations and legal ones.
Moreover, if it remains separate from any new staff organization,
CRS could provide a check on the new staff, which is likely to be
more partisan, much as the Government and Finance Division of
CRS now provides a check on the economic analyses of the CBO, the
JTC, and other congressional committees.
We propose, therefore, that a new congressional office be
formed, along the lines of the CBO or the JTC. The Office for Consti-
tutional Issues (OCI) will be headed by a Chief of Staff appointed by
some bipartisan group of party leaders. There are several models for
the appointments process. For example, the Senate Legal Counsel is
responsible to the Joint Leadership Group, which consists of the
President pro tempore, the majority and minority leaders, the chair
and ranking member of the Judiciary Committee, and the chair and
ranking member of the Government Operations Committee.128 That
group, perhaps without the representatives from Government Opera-
126. MORGAN, supra note 17, at 358-59 (noting that this practice prevailed in the 1960s).
127. American Law Division Wins ABA Public Service Award, Library of Congress, at
http://lcweb.loc.gov/today/pr/1994/94-139 (Aug. 16, 1994) (stating also that from 1989 to 1993,
the division processed more than 147,000 inquiries and produced more than 3,200 reports,
opinions and analyses) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
128. The legal counsel in the House, called the General Counsel, is responsible to the
Speaker of the House, who then consults with a Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (including
majority and minority leaders) in giving direction to the General Counsel. Rules of the House of
Representatives, Rule 2, Other Officers and Officials, available at http://clerkweb.house.gov/
106/docs/rules/AllRules.htm.
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tions, is well-suited to appoint the head of the OCI. Or, the Chief of
Staff of the new constitutional office could be appointed by the
Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore, after consulta-
tion with the Judiciary Committees, much as the CBO Director is
(but there with consultation with the Budget Committees). When the
same party controls both houses, this latter process is somewhat less
bipartisan than the process used for appointing the Senate Legal
Counsel. But, in the CBO-appointment model, party leaders would
have as much or more influence over the appointment than commit-
tee chairs, a factor which could better ensure responsiveness to the
entire body, rather than close affiliation with committees anxious to
protect their turfs and possibly consisting of preference outliers.
The staff of the OCI will be appointed in the same way that the
CBO appoints its professional staff members. The Chief of Staff will
appoint them, including any deputies, and all appointments will be
based solely on professional competence, without regard to political
affiliation. Much like the CBO and the JTC, the staff will be a mix of
lawyers and other professionals and scholars, in this case political sci-
entists, historians, and public policy professionals with interests in
constitutional law. Perhaps the Chief of Staff should be an attorney,
but that is not clearly the best strategy. The institutional advantage of
Congress with regard to constitutional issues is its ability to blend
policy considerations with technical legal arguments. Thus, it is im-
portant that members receive not only legalistic arguments, but also
learn of the broader policy implications of a particular constitutional
interpretation relative to others. Lawyers are not always the best pro-
fessionals to perform this broader sort of analysis. The analyses and
reports produced by the staff will be publicly available so that citizens
will have access to the information that shapes the constitutional de-
liberation and decisionmaking of their representatives.
OCI will consult with its counterparts in the executive branch, as
CBO staff does with OMB and other agency officials, and as JTC staff
does with Treasury and Internal Revenue Service staff. Such consul-
tations will often be largely informal, although it may make sense to
formalize some interactions so that they occur as a matter of course
and so that the opinions of executive branch experts are available to
all members of Congress.129 Congress will have to balance the advan-
tage of widespread dissemination of views with the inevitable chilling
129. In some states, legislatures can ask the attorney general for her opinion on the legality
of pending legislation. Abrahamson & Hughes, supra note 124, at 1060.
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effect formal and public disclosure will have. In the tax context, for
example, Congress has a mix of formal and informal interactions, with
executive branch officials testifying regularly and providing reports
and with other staff participating in drafting sessions and informal
consultations. OCI should also determine whether its staff or law-
makers will consult formally with members of the judiciary. It seems
very unlikely that sitting judges will be comfortable giving their
opinions about constitutional issues likely to come before them,130 but
retired judges may well serve as a source of expertise. Congressional
staff should be encouraged to analyze any judicial advice rigorously
through the legislative lens, remembering that the legalistic approach
of judges may not be as appropriate for Congress. Finally, OCI will
no doubt also rely on input and analysis by academics, many of whom
will be eager to participate in the process as a way for their ideas and
scholarship to shape policies. Scholars will not only be a free and
helpful resource for OCI, they will also certainly be available to tes-
tify and consult directly with lawmakers.
3. Committee Structure to Consider Constitutional Issues. Those
who are skeptical about Congress’s capacity to make informed and
reflective decisions about constitutional issues point to the relatively
low quality of debate on the floors of the House and Senate. Abner
Mikva argues: “[B]oth houses are large, making the process of
engaging in complex arguments during a floor debate difficult. For
the most part, the speeches made on the floor are designed to get a
member’s position on the record rather than to initiate a dialogue.”131
This indictment is probably accurate but fundamentally unfair. As
Mikva, a former member of Congress, knows, most congressional
deliberation does not occur on the floor; it is done in committees. So
the relevant—and perhaps the most important—consideration is the
committee framework through which such issues are analyzed. There
are at least three alternatives for the committee structure of our
Congressional Framework for Constitutional Issues.
First, the jurisdiction of the current Judiciary Committees could
be expanded so that they would also have responsibility for consid-
130. ROBERT A. KATZMANN, COURTS AND CONGRESS 85 (1997) (“To some degree, courts
are hesitant to play a greater role because of constitutional prohibitions against rendering advi-
sory opinions . . . and because of the need to avoid prejudging issues that might come before
them.”).
131. Abner J. Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61
N.C. L. REV. 587, 609 (1983).
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ering bills identified at referral or later as implicating significant con-
stitutional issues. The Judiciary Committees would have jurisdiction
to consider the constitutional implications of the bill, to work with the
OCI to prepare the constitutional impact statement, and to make
amendments to the language designed to reflect the constitutional
findings. In the House, multiple referral techniques, amended in
1995,132 would provide the framework for the shared jurisdiction be-
tween the substantive committee and the Judiciary Committee. (Of
course, in some cases, the Judiciary Committee would also be the
substantive committee, and thus its deliberations would include dis-
cussions of the substance of the proposal as well as the constitutional
issues raised.) The substantive committee would serve as the primary
committee, so that when it discharged a bill, Judiciary would have
only a limited time period in which to perform its role. The Judiciary
Committee could also hold hearings and consider the bill concur-
rently with the substantive committee’s deliberations. Multiple refer-
ral occurs less often in the Senate, but it is not unheard of, and it
could be structured much like current House procedures. The Judici-
ary Committees would decide whether to use subcommittees to han-
dle this new responsibility133 or to oversee hearings and other prelimi-
nary work in the full committee. The recent trend has been away
from the use of subcommittees, but it might be a sensible way to han-
dle the additional workload within binding time constraints.
The advantages of using the Judiciary Committees are obvious.
These committees already have some expertise in constitutional is-
sues, and they have reputations for relatively serious and careful con-
sideration of legal and constitutional questions.134 The disadvantages,
however, are substantial, although somewhat less apparent. First, be-
cause the committees are composed almost entirely of lawyers, their
analyses tend to be legalistic and to replicate what they think judges
would say on an issue. They are among the most deferential of law-
makers to courts and traditional legal reasoning.135 Second, committee
assignments are largely a matter of self-selection, and the lawmakers
132. SINCLAIR, supra note 87, at 12-13.
133. The House Committee on the Judiciary has a Subcommittee on the Constitution, and
the Senate Judiciary Committee has a Subcommittee on the Constitution, Federalism, and
Property Rights.
134. Miller, supra note 17, at 959-61 (describing the Judiciary Committee members’ legal
experience and their respect for, and deference to, courts).
135. Mark C. Miller, Congress and the Constitution: A Tale of Two Committees, 3 CONST.
L.J. 317, 339-40 (1993).
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who want to serve on the Judiciary Committees tend to be at the ex-
tremes of the ideological spectrum. Thus, the Judiciary Committees
are often more polarized than other committees and less representa-
tive of the body.136 Adding significant constitutional issues affecting
pending legislation to the committees’ portfolios would only exacer-
bate this tendency, attracting more lawyers with intense preferences
on constitutional interpretation. The polarization might affect the
committees’ deliberations, making compromise less possible and po-
tentially holding up legislation.
It is likely that the substantive committees with primary jurisdic-
tion over legislation subject to our new Framework would vehe-
mently object to sharing power with the Judiciary Committees.137 In
the budget context, framers discovered that standing committees re-
sisted reallocations of jurisdiction to other existing committees be-
cause of turf jealousies.138 The solution in the budget arena—creating
entirely new committees with little substantive responsibility but with
significant power to coordinate the actions of other committees—may
well be the best framework for the consideration of constitutional is-
sues and provides the second model of committee organization of the
constitutional framework. Just as with the Budget Committees in
1974, Congress has more flexibility in designing new committees and
thus can avoid some of the weaknesses of the Judiciary Committees.
For example, the rules setting up the new Committees on Constitu-
tional Matters could specify that only a certain number of members
could be lawyers, and the rules could require representation from
other standing committees (as the House Budget Committee does). It
might make some sense to appoint a few members of the Judiciary
Committees to the new committees, at least in the early years, to gain
from their expertise. To reduce entrenchment on these committees,
terms of service could be limited, using the House Budget Committee
and the Select Committees on Intelligence as models; term limits
would reduce the expertise of the members, however. Because the
committees would be new, and thus lack a strong tradition of senior-
136. E.g., Miller, supra note 17, at 959-60 (discussing the tendency of House Judiciary
Committee members to be ideologically extreme); Ross, supra note 98, at 358 n.190 (describing
the unrepresentative makeup of the Senate Judiciary Committee).
137. Roger H. Davidson, Congressional Committees in the New Reform Era: From Combat
to Contract, in REMAKING CONGRESS 28, 48 (James A. Thurber & Roger H. Davidson eds.,
1995) (describing the likelihood of opposition to reform by “[l]eaders and members who sus-
pect[ ] that their committees might be targets for elimination or jurisdictional trimming”).
138. Garrett, supra note 96, at 438.
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ity in committee assignments, and because they would have far-
ranging jurisdiction affecting many pieces of major legislation, it is
likely that party leaders would rely heavily on party loyalty in making
appointments and would generally exert more control over commit-
tee decisions. That has certainly been the experience with the Budget
Committees.139
Referrals to these new committees would work in the same way
as the first option of using the existing Judiciary Committees. In both
cases, committee members would rely on their own committee staff as
well as the technical staff of the OCI. Arguably, the rules setting up
the OCI should indicate that its primary responsibility is to respond
to requests of the committees with jurisdiction over constitutional is-
sues, most importantly to prepare constitutional impact statements
and provide related analysis. Responding to inquiries from noncom-
mittee legislators should be the technical staff’s second priority. For
example, CBO staff respond in a timely fashion to as many requests
as possible from members on and off the Budget Committees. But
when time is tight at the end of a session, explicit guidelines allow the
expert staff to concentrate their efforts appropriately. If lawmakers
decide to establish new committees, they should also consider giving
these new committees a role in the selection of the Chief of Staff of
the OCI, with the ultimate decision vested with party leaders.
This second option for committee organization has problems,
many shared with the first option of giving jurisdiction to the Judici-
ary Committees. First, members willing to serve on the committees
would likely have intense and outlying preferences just as do the cur-
rent members of the Judiciary Committees. Although party leaders
could work to constitute more representative entities, they might find
it difficult to convince legislators without intense interest in constitu-
tional issues to spend their time serving on these committees. Now,
the Budget Committees are considered prestige committees that are
desirable assignments,140 but at the outset, some members were reluc-
tant to invest in developing expertise related to a committee that
seemed subservient to the appropriations and tax-writing committees.
The experience of our new committees might be different from the
Budget Committees, however. Originally, the Budget Committees
139. Elizabeth Garrett, The Congressional Budget Process: Strengthening the Party-in-
Government, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 702, 715 (2000).
140. Cf. CHRISTOPHER J. DEERING & STEVEN S. SMITH, COMMITTEES IN CONGRESS 69, 71
(3d ed. 1997) (noting that limited terms in the House and nonexclusive jurisdiction somewhat
reduce the prestige associated with the Budget Committees).
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had very little legislative power; the Committees on Constitutional
Matters would have more ability to amend legislation, so they could
become powerful more quickly.
Second, situating the constitutional analysis in specialized com-
mittees, rather than in the substantive committees that have primary
jurisdiction over legislation, would artificially separate constitutional
issues from the larger policy issues. Determinations about rights
guaranteed by the Constitution are often abstract, and perhaps even
meaningless, without simultaneous decisions about how resources will
be directed toward vindicating those rights. A poor woman’s right to
reproductive choice means little to her without the resources to act on
her decision; Brown v. Board of Education141 resulted in few tangible
improvements in education and other facilities until funding was pro-
vided, the voting rights acts were passed, and the public commitment
to racial equality strengthened. By placing the constitutional inquiry
in a different forum from the other consideration of legislation, Con-
gress would signal that it thinks the analyses are capable of clean
separation. Furthermore, the advantages to considering constitutional
issues along with issues more traditionally considered policy ones
would be lost. Pragmatically, it is very difficult to clearly separate the
two kinds of issues. Thus, a bifurcated committee structure could
cause confusion, duplication, or conflicting messages from the various
committees to the full Congress and the public.
The third organizational option, consistent with the design of the
UMRA, addresses this problem of separation. Under this model, the
substantive committees would perform the constitutional analysis as
they considered any bill implicating serious constitutional issues. In
most cases, they would know at the time of referral that special con-
stitutional analysis was required. In other cases, awareness of the sig-
nificant issue would develop as OCI and committee members and
staff assessed each active bill in order to draft a constitutional impact
statement to accompany the committee report. The committees could
determine whether to hold additional hearings on the constitutional
issue or to combine that assessment with general hearings on the
merits of a proposal. Although members would develop less expertise
on constitutional issues than would be the case in the other two mod-
els, they could rely on OCI’s technical staff, on their own committee
counsel, and on lawyers on their personal staff. In addition, individual
members might well become more involved in the constitutional is-
141. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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sues because of personal preferences (much as occurs now on the
generalist tax-writing committees where individual members special-
ize in agriculture provisions, oil and gas incentives, or other narrow
areas), although this development might be unwelcome if the special-
ists were lawyers who received too much deference to their overly le-
galistic approaches.
The dynamics of committee consideration would be different if
the constitutional assessment were left in the substantive committees
rather than placed in specialized committees. First, the substantive
committees would likely be less polarized on constitutional issues
than the Judiciary or similar committees. Members would have se-
lected the substantive committees because of their interest in the
policies that fall within their jurisdiction, and only secondarily (if at
all) because of their views on constitutional issues. In other words,
members of the Agriculture Committees may have firm positions on
farm policy, but they have less intense views on constitutional issues
that their bills implicate, such as federalism, the delegation doctrine,
or the federal spending power. This characteristic of the substantive
committees’ membership might allow for more moderated, and per-
haps more thoughtful, deliberation. On the other hand, it might mean
that constitutional issues would be slighted, because members would
not care much about them.142 In that case, the attention constitutional
issues received would depend on the salience provided by the new
Framework and interest-group agitation, the latter a sort of improved
fire-alarm mechanism enhanced by the Framework and the informa-
tion it produces.
Second, the interest-group dynamics would be very different in
the substantive committees. Substantive committees attract the atten-
tion of groups with stakes in the policies within their jurisdiction. So
the members of the Agriculture Committees interact mainly with
farm groups, environmental groups, consumer groups, state and local
officials with responsibility for farm policy, and others with particular
142. MORGAN, supra note 17, at 352-53 (arguing that substantive committees should not be
responsible for the assessment of constitutional issues because they are concerned primarily
with “development and effectuation of specialized and often technical policies”). Similar argu-
ments can be found in Miller, supra note 135, at 341-43 (noting that while “Judiciary members
and staff undertake sincere efforts to anticipate how the federal courts will read the legislative
language produced by the Committee . . . . [substantive] committees are much less concerned
about writing legislation that the courts will find constitutional”). We expect that the substantive
committees would do a better job deliberating constitutional issues under our proposed system
than they do now because they would be able to work with specialized staff and benefit from the
work of interest groups that the new Framework prompts.
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interests in agriculture. The committees are monitored primarily by
trade publications concerned with farmers, food production, and rural
policies. These groups, and their lobbyists, would invest resources in
studying constitutional issues, because the new Framework would be
another strategic opportunity to affect a bill’s fate, but they would not
initially possess expertise in such issues. They would invest in devel-
oping expertise and producing useful information, because the consti-
tutional Framework would affect the policies adopted by substantive
committees. Their information might be particularly helpful because
they could infuse their legal analysis with their knowledge of the un-
derlying policies. In contrast, using multiple referrals and specialized
committees would mean that the groups with the most sustained in-
teraction with lawmakers on constitutional issues would be those in-
terested in legal issues and constitutional law. Groups like the Ameri-
can Bar Association, the American Civil Liberties Union, the
Institute for Justice, and legal academics would exert the primary in-
fluence on the deliberations of the Judiciary Committees or the
Committees on Constitutional Matters. These groups would have less
influence if the constitutional inquiry were done by dozens of sub-
stantive committees, because their attention would be fragmented
and their resources deployed widely.
The structure of interest-group activity and conflict is a crucial
element in committee design. All three options present strengths and
weaknesses in this respect. We believe that it would be easier for sub-
stantive committees, working with the expert OCI and getting advice
from the executive branch and other outside experts, to include the
law-oriented interest groups when appropriate than it would be for
specialized committees to appropriately blend policy and constitu-
tional law in their deliberations. OCI should adopt guidelines for sub-
stantive committees considering bills with significant constitutional
implications to encourage them to invite legal experts to testify at
hearings or to submit written statements. OCI’s formal and informal
consultation with expert groups and lawyers in the executive branch
would help these interest groups to overcome the problems of frag-
mentation and to learn of significant constitutional issues in time to
weigh in on the outcome. In a sense, the contact entity for the consti-
tutional-law-oriented interest groups would be OCI, which would also
serve as a conduit to inform the groups about decisions they want to
influence. Substantive interest groups would adapt to the new system
by developing their own constitutional impact experts (much as many
do now with revenue estimators and budget experts), hiring consult-
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ants specializing in this new aspect of the legislative process, or
working in coalitions to cooperate in producing necessary informa-
tion. Although these costs might be significant, they would often be
justified by the benefits offered by the legislation at stake.
As the substantive committees considered the constitutional is-
sues, members and staff would produce studies, analyses, and distilla-
tions of others’ views. In addition, there would often be public hear-
ings with testimony from staff, officials of other branches, legal
experts, and others.143 Not only do hearings help inform members and
the public, but the openness and wide participation promotes greater
citizen involvement in the deliberation and decisionmaking. Issues
raised in the hearings would prompt more analysis and alert inter-
ested parties to submit additional views. As gaps in coverage ap-
peared during the process, OCI staff could focus their efforts to pro-
duce information not submitted by private parties; indeed, they might
discover gaps as they did preliminary work to prepare for committee
consideration. All the material would be used in the constitutional
impact statements and made available to non-committee members
and the public.
If a specialized committee model of organization is used, these
committees could oversee any annual or more global report prepared
by OCI. If the model of substantive committees is selected as we rec-
ommend, the OCI comprehensive report could be submitted to the
party leadership and made widely available to all members of Con-
gress. For example, the annual assessment of the Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act prepared by CBO is distributed to all members and
groups that confer regularly with staff, and it is available on the CBO
webpage.
4. Floor Consideration and Points of Order. Procedures
structuring floor deliberation seek to balance a number of competing
concerns. First, certain structures, notably points of order, reduce the
chances that Congress will inadvertently or intentionally ignore
difficult or controversial issues, a problem many critics of
143. A good case study for such hearings are those that accompanied enactment of the Re-
ligious Freedom Restoration Act. MICHAEL A. BAMBERGER, RECKLESS LEGISLATION: HOW
LAWMAKERS IGNORE THE CONSTITUTION 153-66 (2000) (discussing the involvement of legal
academics and others in Congress’s evaluation of the constitutionality of the RFRA); Michael
W. McConnell, Comment, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores,
111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 160 (1997) (noting that both houses of Congress held public hearings to
assist in determining the constitutionality of the proposed act).
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congressional performance in this area have noted.144 Even though
most members may want to avoid such issues, and the party leaders
may work to structure a bill or floor consideration to spare their
members difficult votes,145 the availability of a point of order can
allow one lawmaker (or a few) to halt proceedings, highlight the
issue, and force a roll-call vote. Especially in the House, where the
floor is tightly controlled by the Rules Committee, a point of order
that cannot be waived in a special rule empowers individual members
and reduces the chance of success of avoidance techniques.
Furthermore, the point-of-order process focuses legislative attention
on the constitutional issue and provides the opportunity for sustained
debate for which members can be held accountable. Occasionally,
constitutional issues identified by a handful of members have been
brushed aside during the rush of floor debate and activity.146 Points of
order make that more difficult.
On the other hand, points of order can be used to stall or derail
legislation by lawmakers who oppose the proposal but who do not
care about the constitutional issue. In a system of lawmaking like
ours, which is full of procedural hurdles, opponents of change, even
when they constitute a minority of lawmakers, can strategically use
points of order or other rules.147 Strategic use of the point-of-order
procedure can nonetheless force sincere debate and deliberation
about important issues, so the motivation behind the objection may
not be relevant in all cases. But as Congress adopts new procedural
frameworks, it must be aware that additional process makes enacting
laws more difficult. This is particularly true outside the budget con-
text where bills do not have to be passed and the status quo can pre-
vail indefinitely without calamitous consequences such as a govern-
ment shutdown. Thus, floor procedures must balance the need to
allow the opportunity for lawmakers to focus on constitutional issues
and the need to enact some legislation.
144. E.g., Mikva, supra note 131, at 609 (“Both institutionally and politically, Congress is
designed to pass over the constitutional questions, leaving the hard decisions for the courts.”).
145. Barbara Sinclair, Parties in Congress: New Roles and Leadership Trends, in THE
PARTIES RESPOND: CHANGES IN AMERICAN PARTIES AND CAMPAIGNS 299, 312-13 (L. Sandy
Maisel ed., 1994).
146. BAMBERGER, supra note 143, at 69 (noting this with respect to the Communications
Decency Act and objections brought by Senators Leahy and Feingold).
147. Ross, supra note 98, at 364-65 (discussing the use of constitutional points of order to
advance political interests).
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Currently, the Senate allows members to raise constitutional
points of order;148 the House Rules do not, although representatives
have objected to legislation on the ground that it violated the pre-
rogatives of the House under the Origination Clause of the Constitu-
tion.149 The practice in both houses is that the presiding officer does
not rule on the question but instead refers it to the full chamber for a
vote. The Framework institutionalizes these points of order, drawing
on the experience with other congressional procedural frameworks
that are enforced in this way. First, a point of order can be raised by
any lawmaker to object to considering a bill that is not accompanied
by a constitutional impact statement. Such enforcement is required to
ensure that the statements are systematically produced in a timely
fashion. Second, a point of order can be raised against any bill with
provisions designed to require early judicial determination of consti-
tutional issues. If these provisions encourage Congress to shirk its re-
sponsibility to think carefully about constitutional issues, they should
be more difficult to include in legislation. Third, a member can raise a
point of order against any bill that she believes raises a significant
constitutional issue. The information provided in the constitutional
impact statements will help alert members to objectionable or worri-
some proposals, although members may also discover issues on their
own. Importantly, a legislator will not be limited to raising constitu-
tional issues identified initially by the parliamentarian or discussed in
the constitutional impact statement.
For this process to be effective in the House of Representatives,
the Rules Committee should not be allowed to waive points of order
in a special rule, thereby circumventing the objection and recorded
vote.150 To reduce the strategic use of the third point of order that
148. FLOYD M. RIDDICK & ALAN S. FRUMIN, RIDDICK’S SENATE PROCEDURE 52-54
(1992).
149. Ross, supra note 98, at 359 n.193. This conclusion was confirmed in a phone conversa-
tion with a lawyer in the House parliamentarian’s office. However, some House precedents sug-
gest that other constitutional points of order may be raised and voted on by the House. E.g., 15
LEWIS DESCHLER & WILLIAM HOLMES BROWN, DESCHLER-BROWN PRECEDENTS OF THE
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 67-71 (1999) (stating that it is “for the House
 . . . to determine on the constitutionality of the bill”).
150. WILLIAM HOLMES BROWN, HOUSE PRACTICE: A GUIDE TO THE RULES,
PRECEDENTS AND PROCEDURES OF THE HOUSE 641-42 (1996) (detailing when a point of order
may be waived). One of the House parliamentarians stated in a phone conversation that the
Rules Committee would never waive a constitutional point of order in a special rule, but such a
waiver appears possible under current rules. In addition, a member might well discover a consti-
tutional point of order only after the Rules Committee adopted a closed or modified closed rule
which would preclude any objections not identified in the rule itself.
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raises a significant constitutional issue with regard to any bill, a mem-
ber objecting to consideration of the bill must present to the presiding
office a petition signed by twenty members in the House and ten
members in the Senate indicating their support for the objection. This
innovation is not a feature of any similar congressional framework.
The closest analog arises in cloture, where a petition to vote to cut off
debate in the Senate must be signed by sixteen senators.151 Related
but less similar is the rule in the House of Representatives that a ma-
jority of the membership can force the discharge of a bill from a
committee of jurisdiction.152 The requirement in the constitutional
context makes the point-of-order strategy more costly to those trying
to use it to force changes in the bill, but it still allows a small group of
intensely concerned lawmakers to bring the attention of the full body
to a constitutional issue.
We favor this design feature because we anticipate that constitu-
tional points of order will arise more frequently than, for example,
budget points of order. The latter concern fairly discrete issues (e.g.,
is an amendment revenue-neutral?) that can be avoided by bill draft-
ers. Constitutional issues, on the other hand, can be raised in more
contexts—either sincerely or strategically—and thus pose a more far-
reaching procedural threat to legislation. This part of the Framework
could be modified so that it would provide more protection to bills
raising one or more of the constitutional issues that courts decline to
review. For example, a single member could be allowed to raise a
point of order if the issue were one that courts are unlikely to review
(as defined by the parliamentarian advised by the group of legal ex-
perts and the OCI staff), and a group of members would be required
only with respect to issues that receive robust judicial scrutiny. This
modification would increase the complexity of the procedure, but it
would tailor the Framework to mirror the greater concern with Con-
gress’s deliberation of constitutional issues that are unreviewed by the
courts.
Finally, we recommend that only a majority vote be required to
waive any of the three points of order. Some budget points of order
can be waived in the Senate only by a vote of sixty members, and
generally supermajority voting requirements afford greater protection
to minority interests than the traditional majority voting rule. Our
choice of majority voting rule is driven by our principle of balance—
151. RIDDICK & FRUMIN, supra note 148, at 283 (restating Senate Rule XXII, ¶ 2).
152. BROWN, supra note 150, at 433-41.
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the Framework should allow opportunities for deliberation and modi-
fication but not halt a great deal of legislative activity. The voting rule
may not matter very much in the Senate, because most of this legisla-
tion would also be subject to filibusters that can be broken only by a
supermajority vote of sixty senators. But lawmakers may be more
willing to vote to cut off lengthy debate than to vote against a serious
constitutional objection, so it is not clear that the two votes are inter-
changeable. A supermajority requirement in the House would be a
significant new hurdle; no budget point of order in the House requires
more than a majority to waive, and only a rule applying to a narrow
subset of tax increases is formally enforced through a supermajority
voting requirement.
We think a separate vote, which disaggregates the lawmaker’s
stand on the constitutional issue from her final vote and eliminates or
reduces her ability to explain away a troublesome position on the
constitutional matter as a necessary evil to passing an omnibus bill
with numerous provisions that her constituents like, is sufficient pro-
tection.153 But rules can be changed, and enforcement procedures
calibrated over time to account for experience. Budget rules have
changed substantially over nearly three decades as lawmaker objec-
tives have changed and as problems in the process have been identi-
fied. For example, the Framework could require supermajority votes
in the context of constitutional issues left unreviewed by the judiciary
and require only a majority for other constitutional points of order.
Furthermore, there may be an advantage to supermajority require-
ments peculiar to the constitutional realm. Building consensus and
demonstrating wide margins of support for constitutional positions
may be important for the legitimacy of those determinations. Con-
gress already has a number of formal and informal structures that re-
sult in wide margins of victory for most major legislation.154 The ques-
tion is whether an additional supermajority vote would be beneficial,
or whether a constitutional determination even by a bare majority of
both houses of Congress, already a supermajority requirement, has
more legitimacy in the eyes of the public than, for example, a 5-4 de-
cision by the Supreme Court.
153. Ross, supra note 98, at 359-60 (arguing that a “process designed to separate merits from
constitutionality” would encourage members to determine the issues in a relatively independent
way without allowing their views on the former to bias their constitutional determination and
citing examples).
154. TUSHNET, supra note 4, at 52.
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III.  WHY NOW?
One final pragmatic question about the Framework remains: why
would such a process appeal to members of Congress now? Several
factors make this an auspicious time to consider a comprehensive
framework to structure deliberation about constitutional issues. The
success of the other procedural frameworks encourages this sort of
solution for any collective-action problem facing Congress. The
budget process is now ubiquitous. No piece of legislation, other than
routine and noncontroversial acts, can be considered or enacted with-
out legislators giving some thought to the effect of the budget proc-
ess.155 Congress uses budget reconciliation vehicles several times dur-
ing a session to pass major policy changes because such acts are
insulated from some delay tactics, and other legislation may trigger
budget points of order. The UMRA is considered to be such a success
that members have floated proposals to expand its coverage.156 In-
deed, the Republican Congress’s concerns about federalism and dele-
gation issues have led to numerous proposals to adopt procedural
frameworks intended to shape deliberation in particular ways; proc-
ess-oriented reform seems to be more popular than enacting substan-
tive reforms directly.157 Just as in other institutions, there are elements
of path dependence and incrementalism to the reforms adopted by
Congress. Members tend to apply familiar tactics to new problems,
and they favor expanding old structures or using them as blueprints
rather than inventing wholly new approaches. Procedural reforms are
in vogue in Congress now. It seems an auspicious time to consider a
comprehensive framework that makes incremental progress towards
the goal of a Thayerian Congress.
Support for such a framework will come from members who be-
lieve they can do a better job when considering constitutional issues,
155. E.g., DEERING & SMITH, supra note 140, at 193-94 (describing “the ascendance and
continuing preeminence of budget politics” as “[t]he most important change in the political
agenda during the last two decades”); BURDETT A. LOOMIS, THE CONTEMPORARY CONGRESS
46 (2d ed. 1998) (referring to the “fiscalization” of the entire congressional process brought
about by the budget process).
156. E.g., Federalism Act of 1999, H.R. 2245, 106th Cong. §§ 8(b), 10(b) (1999) (requiring
the CBO to produce Federalism Impact Statements for all reported bills and to submit annual
reports on preemption and requiring the CRS to prepare reports about court decisions affecting
federalism); Mandates Information Act of 1999, H.R. 350 & S. 427, 106th Cong. § 4 (1999) (es-
tablishing new procedural hurdles for “private-sector mandates”).
157. Federalism, Preemption, and Regulatory Reform (Dec. 21, 2000) (listing proposals that
are inspired in part by the UMRA, “the most impressive recent . . . enactment,” dealing with the
constitutional issues), Nat’l Governors Ass’n, http://old.nga.org/106Congress/Federalism.asp (on
file with the Duke Law Journal).
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as well as from members or groups in Congress who believe that the
Framework will advance other objectives important to them. For ex-
ample, some of the support for the UMRA surely came from conser-
vative lawmakers who hoped to make it significantly more difficult to
pass federal programs and expand the influence of the federal gov-
ernment. Similarly, the budget process, at least since 1985, has sys-
tematically worked in favor of those who want to shrink the size of
government and erected more obstacles in the way of those who want
new spending projects. Whether these small-government types will
support the Congressional Framework for Constitutional Issues is un-
clear. Unlike the current budget process or the UMRA, there is no
systematic bias in this Framework; it is apt to be triggered by bills re-
ducing the size of government or supporting politically conservative
social policies as often as by bills supported by political liberals. The
ex ante neutrality of the Framework may, however, increase rather
than decrease its political attractiveness, by precluding opposition
from identifiable losers.
Other groups of lawmakers may support the constitutional
Framework for reasons other than or in addition to a concern about
better deliberation of constitutional issues. Depending on the struc-
ture adopted, party leaders may favor adopting the process, because it
could shift power away from committees and toward centralized party
entities. This shift is most likely if new committees were formed to
consider constitutional issues and if party leaders had disproportion-
ate influence over the appointment of the technical staff. However,
any process that increases the importance of floor activity for the fate
and shape of legislation tends to increase the power of party leaders
relative to committee chairs and leaders.158 Arguably, members of
Congress who are lawyers could become more influential with the
adoption of this procedure if other members routinely defer to their
opinions about the legal ramifications of legislation. We do not think
this would be a desirable outcome.
Note that none of these factors is inconsistent with the diagnosis
of a collective-action problem regarding constitutional deliberation,
with the case for procedural or accuracy-based benefits of constitu-
tional deliberation, or with the empirical claim that some legislators
give some weight to constitutional argument some of the time. They
amount to saying that policy entrepreneurs within Congress will
benefit, on nonconstitutional dimensions, from advancing framework
158. Garrett, supra note 139, at 722 (making a similar point in the budget context).
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legislation that provides a collective benefit in terms of Congress’s
constitutional performance. But that is usually, perhaps always, true
of resolutions to collective-action problems; self-interested entrepre-
neurs benefit by satisfying the latent collective demand for a publicly
beneficial solution.
CONCLUSION
Our objective has been to introduce more sustained considera-
tion of institutional-design questions into a discussion that has almost
exclusively focused on questions of institutional choice. Whether
Congress retains its current role in constitutional interpretation or
whether that role is expanded, procedural and institutional devices
like those we have described here promise to enhance congressional
performance in this arena. A well-functioning Thayerian Congress is
one that takes advantage of the lessons learned from modern proce-
dural frameworks to allow it to structure constitutional deliberation
and decisionmaking so as to improve outcomes.
